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The dissertation has been organized into six parts: In part I, the
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investigation. In part III the research design chosen, the variables and their
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and directions for future research, given the most important weaknesses of the
present study as well as opportunities offered by the results. Part VI consists
of the appendixes.
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Introduction

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. PURPOSE OF STUDY
The importance of strategy for organizational adaptation and growth, as well as
survival, seems well agreed upon in the literature (Ansoff, 1980; Holbæk,
1983; Porter, 1980). This concern has materialized into a range of different
planning and strategic problem handling systems. In these systems, the human
processes behind the formulation of strategy have been disregarded in favor of
the organizational procedures for planning, collecting information and
directives on how to collect information from the environment (Ansoff, 1980;
Bourgeois, 1985). In recent years, however, a scattered group of writers have
occupied themselves with the actual perception and definition of strategic issues
(Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983; Falkenberg, & Grønhaug, 1988;
Gripsrud, & Grønhaug, 1985; Grønhaug, & Haukedal, 1988; Kilmann, &
Mitroff, 1979; Lyles, & Mitroff, 1980; Mitroff, & Emshoff, 1979; Porac,
Thomas, & Emme, 1985; Schwenk, 1988; Smircich, & Stubbard, 1985).
From these investigations, the finding is emerging that managerial cognition is
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4of importance for the detection of strategically significant events as well as for
qualities of the formulated strategy (Falkenberg, & Grønhaug, 1988;
Grønhaug, & Falkenberk, 1988a; Mintzberg, & Waters, 1984; Porac, Thomas,
& Emme, 1985; Salancik, & Porac, 1986). The reason for this is found in the
subjective elements ~f organizations' environments (Smircich, & Stubbard,
1985) necessitating interpretation of large amounts of ambiguous and weak
signals by individuals. The processing of this kind of data has been found to
be influenced by such variables as cognitive style (Haukedal, 1986;
McKenney, & Keen, 1974), categorisation (Porac, & Thomas, 1988) and
.problem solving strategies (Isenberg, 1986).
The purpose of this dissertation is to further explore the topic of
managerial thought in relation to the identification and formulation of strategic
issues. It has been demonstrated that in perceiving strategically significant
events or elements, managers rely on their own knowledge representations
(Kiesler, & Sproull, 1982; Porac, Thomas & Emme, 1985; Weick, 1979a).
On the other hand, little work has been done concerning the attributes of these
representations and the features associated with their relative effectiveness. It
seems plausible to assume that the quality of managers' cognitive
representations are influenced by experience. In fact, there are some
indications that experienced strategists do not respond to the very complex
environmental information with the strategies predicted by the principle of
bounded rationality (Ross, 1976), which may be explained as a function of
representational qualities. The focus of this work is, accordingly, upon
experienced managers environmental images: Their characteristics and
functions relative to novices'. It is of importance to gain insight into this matter
in order to design better educational and training programs for managers with
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5present or future strategy related tasks, as well as systems for managing
strategic issues in organizations (SIM).
To accomplish this end, an empirical study was undertaken with a
'contrasting groups' design. One group of managers experienced in strategy
formulation in the banking industry, and another group consisting of MBA-
students with no such experience, but with comparable educational
background, responded to four 'projective minicases ' . Their verbalizations
during this process were taped and transcribed. Then the transcripts were
analyzed for their content according to a categoricalcoding scheme.
The study is reported as follows. First, a conceptual framework for
the literature review is presented.' Then the literature is discussed and
summarized in a model showing the salient variables and their
interrelationships. This model is used for generating hypotheses for empirical
testing. Next, a description of the method used follows along with presentation
of the results. Last, the results are discussed in relation to the ideas addressed
at the beginning.
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PART Il
Theory

CHAPTER 2
Environmental Images
2.1. STRATEGICISSUE FORMULATION
This work addresses the process of interpreting the environment, as evidenced
by decision-making processes at the individual level of strategic management.
Specifically, the goal is to analyze the cognitions involved in the perception and
formulation of strategic issues (S.I.). These are defined here as conceptualized
phenomena of actual or potential significance for the organization' s goal
attainment. They derive their importance from the fact that they are the basis
for decision making and problem solving processes (fig. 2.1).
~
Evaluation of
~Strategic Issue alternatives Decision
Fig. 2.1. The decision-making process
The attention given to the decision making process has largely been on
the later stages of evaluation and choice of alternatives. When it comes to the
earlier stages of perceiving and/or formulating the strategic issue, the matter is
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left quite undeveloped. Recently, however, there has been some interest in
these early stages of decision making processes in organizations. There may be
several reasons for this, reflecting the varied theoretical background of this new
orientation: In the area of organization theory, one is concerned with higher
learning processes, which involve the analysis of assumptions behind action
alternatives (Mitroff, & Emshoff, 1979) and the formulation of new action
alternatives rather than merely choosing among a given set (Argyris, & Schon,
1978; Fiol, & Lyles, 1985; Hedberg, 1981). Recently, the strategic
management literature has recognized the subjective element in organizations'
environments. As a consequence of this, strategy formulation is taken as a
point of departure. Authors within this tradition take the stance that
organizations take action in relation to the subjectively defined environment,
and not the one existing by some objective measures (Gripsrud, & Grønhaug,
1985; Lyles, & Thomas, 1988; Porac, Thomas & Emme, 1985; Smircich, &
Stubbard, 1985). In cognitive psychology, and more precisely the problem
solving literature, one has come to recognize the problem formulation stage as
essential for the way solutions are reached and elaborated (Newell, & Simon,
1972).
In these diverse contributions there seems to be a growing agreement
that the actors' environment is not given, but construed and even enacted by the
organization itself. If the environment is not objectively given, then it becomes
a problem to be solved because its characteristics must be worked out by the
actor (Weick, 1979a). It follows that strategic problems do not have unique
formulations (Lyles, & Mitroff, 1980; Ungson, Braunstein, & Hall, 1981).
Moreover, formulating a strategic problem in different ways can result in
different solutions to the same problem. It has also been pointed out that an
error in formulating a strategic problem can simply compound the problem
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGES
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(Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). Lastly, an error in formulating a
strategic problem can result in solving the wrong problem, also referred to as
the Type III error (Mitroff, & Featheringham, 1974). As is implied by these
points, this early stage of the decision making process is of extreme importance
for strategic action, both as adaptation and innovation. Adaptation because
strategic alignment to the environment is dependent upon a 'correct', or at least
functional, formulation of the situation, and innovation because in formulating
the strategic problem the actor is free to define new strategic issues altogether.
Empirical research in this field has largely focused on the
organizational level (Alexander, 1979; Lyles, & Mitroff, 1980; Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984). Still, an increasing number of
research has already required several reviews of the literature on individual
strategy formulation (Cowan, 1986; Lyles, Thomas, 1988; Schwenk, 1988).
This interest in the individual decision-maker is based upon the belief that
although taking place in the social world of organizations, several
circumstances make the individual particularly interesting for the analysis of
strategic decisions. For one thing, individuals seem to be of great importance
for the perception of oppq_n~pities_ (Nutt, 1984). In addition, it has been
pointed out (Holsti, 1976) that non-routine situations, decisions made by top-
level managers relatively free from organizational constraints, high-uncertainty
decisions as in long range planning, highly ambiguous situations and
circumstances of information overload are all conditions where the individual
cognitive processing is of vital importance. The bulk of this work, liowever,
stresses various constraints on cognitive processes (Duhaime, & Schwenk,
1985; Gripsrud, & Grønhaug, 1985; Kiesler, & Sproull, 1982; McKenney, &
Keen, 1974; Porac, & Thomas, 1988; Schwenk, 1984; Schwenk, 1988). In
contrast to this work are some accounts on how strategy formulators with
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGES
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extensive experience in their particular field seem to be less restrained by such
factors than expected (Mintzberg, & Waters, 1984; Ross, 1976). One example
is given by Ross (1976) who analyzed the cause map derived from a delegate
(Gouverneur Morris) to the Constitutional Convention (of what is now the
USA). This delegate was a central person to the Convention, credited with the
final rewriting of the constitution before it was signed, he was very active in the
debates and was generally influential in the very complex issue of designing a
new constitution and management of the executive branch of the government.
He was also known as a complex but gifted debattant. As pointed out by Ross
(op. cit.), referring to Cyert, & March (1963), one would expect the delegate to
apply such cognitive strategies as selecting one goal at the time in order to meet
the constraints on rationality. In fact, he was demonstrated to relate to several
goals at the time. Further, Ross (op. cit.) also points out that one would expect
the 'rationally bounded' delegate to simplify the decision process by satisficing,
i.e. choosing the first alternative meeting some standard instead of evaluating
all alternatives. Again, this simplifying strategy is not evident in this subject's
verbalizations.
The discussion and example above point to a gap in our knowledge of
strategy formulation: How does practised strategy formulators differ from
novices (Salancik, Porac, 1986; Weick, & Bougon, 1986) that make them less
vulnerable to constraints on rationality? The inquiries into this question have
focused on the so called well structured problems, presented to subjects with
varying degrees of expertise e.g. (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon,
1980). Although these studies serve as a point of departure for the present
study, they are unsatisfactory because strategic situations are typically complex,
they must be discovered by the actor and are usually quite confounded
(Kilmann, & Mitroff, 1979; Mason, & Mitroff, 1981). One study {Isenberg,
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1986) compared managers with students in the solving of a business case, thus
simulating managerial responses to strategic problem situations. As he
analyzed their transcribed verbal protocols, valuable insights into the managers'
cognitive processes were gained. His emphasis was on problem solving,
however, so there is little to be learned about the managers' cognitive
representations as such. Of particular interest would be their knowledge
representations drawn from when framing the problems, because these are
demonstrated elsewhere (Newell, & Simon, 1972) to be of central concern in
the formulation of problems generally, and even organizations' adaptation to
their environment (Grønhaug, & Haukedal, 1988).
2.1.1. Conceptual Framework
It follows from the above discussion that individual characteristics may have
quite an impact on strategic choice through their importance for defining the
alternatives. While problem solving and decision-making processes at the
individual level have been studied extensively, the cognitive representations on
which these are based have been largely overlooked in the context of
managerial decision making. Furthermore, the cognitive limitations of
decisionmakers are extensively investigated, while the the characteristics of
effective strategists have not been. The lack of understanding regarding
managerial cognitive representations and the characteristics of experienced
managers' thinking points to a gap in the studies on strategy formulation and
decision making. In other words, we need to know more about experienced
strategists' cognitive representation of strategy related elements. This will be
the point of departure for the present study.
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENT AL IMAGES
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A conceptual framework (fig. 2.1.1.) is offered below, showing the
salient variables and their interrelationships, serving as the point of departure
for this study. Each of these elements are then discussed on the background of
the relevant literature, in separate sections. While only the concepts enclosed in
the heavy frame are analyzed empirically in this study, the others are included
for illustrating the theoretical framework in which they are embedded. On the
basis of the theory discussion the model is elaborated upon at the conclusion of
chapter 3, and will then serve as a point of departure for generating hypotheses
for empirical testing.
Strategic
Stimuli
~~
Experience - Environmental - Strategic IssueImage
Fig. 2.1.1. Theoretical framework
Fig. 2.1.1. should be read as follows: The strategic issues are outputs
of a cognitive process resting on environmental images (EI). These are
individual cognitive representations of the organization's internal and external
environment. The images differ among individuals, and are related to the
person's experience. With recourse to the El, the strategic stimuli (SS) are
processed. The SS is conceived of as triggering the process of interpretation,
but also being the result of active scanning on the part of theactor and based
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGES
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upon information in the EI (Neisser, 1967). This relationship is therefore
noted by a two-way arrow. Strategic stimuli may be seen as the input to the
process resulting in the awareness of a strategic issue, and defined as changes
in the environment that are of potential importance for the organization. As is
often pointed out, organizational managers find themselves in a constantly
changing environment which poses varying demands for change and
adaptation. Three general sources of strategic stimuli have been identified:
Trends in the external environment, the evolutionary trends within the
organization, and trends in its performance (Ansoff, 1980). Examples of these-----
are: Inflationary trends, complexity of organization and solvency of the
enterprise.
Strategic stimuli are merely data with no inherent meaning in
themselves, they are phenomena to notice or not. They have several qualities
which probably contribute to their visibility. Examples are dimensions like
intensity, rate of development, frequency, novelty and duration. The more
important point is that they require additional information gathering,
interpretation, and diagnosis (Bonge, 1972) in order to be useful in a strategy
formulation process. For example, the news that solvency is decreased (SS)
would require additional data on for example projected cash flow in order to be
interpretable as a strategic issue of value. Other information that could be of
help in this interpretation process is the goodwill of funders, experience with
similar episodes in the past and probable economical outcomes according to
financialmodels.
Seen in this light, strategic issue formulation is a complex conceptual
and behavioral act operating on perceived stimuli of the environment, where SS
are inputs and SI the resultant output. Thus, in order to understand strategic
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issues as they are formulated, it is not enough to investigate the stimuli' s
sources which they refer to, as is usual (Porter, 1980). What may be more
important is the person(s) doing the perceiving and conceptualizing (Smircich,
& Stubbard, 1985) and their cognitive representations of the strategy related
environment.
2.2. THENATUREOFENVIRONMENTALIMAGES
Here, the framework's concept 'environmental image' is explored on the basis
of existing literature. 'Image' as used here, refers to the individual managers'
cognitive representation of their organizations' environment. As there is no
literature on environmental representations specific for the strategic
management field, it is necessary to access theory and findings that are
indirectly relevant. Specifically, the tradition developed in cognitive science is
applied in the following.
The question of cognitive representations is an old one in psychology.
The earliest issue was whether this construct had any value at all for the study
of human behavior. It was pointed out. that introspection, the typical method
for studying cognitions, did not meet basic standards for scientific procedures
like reliability and objectivity. However, with the possibility of simulating
human thought on computers and the difficulties involved in explaining verbal
behavior as stimulus-response chains, 'cognitive representation' have gradually
come to be accepted as an important construct (for a more complete discussion,
see for example Gardner, 1985). Some studies commencing in the early 1970s
definitely turned the question from one about the existence of mental
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representations to inquiries about their properties. In typical studies of this
sort, subjects are asked to compare two geometrical forms when one of them is
rotated. Reaction times preceding decisions about the identity of these forms is
contingent upon the size of the angle of difference between the orientations of
the two forms (Shepard, & Metzler, 1971). For example, it was found that
when the angle between the fonns' orientation were zero, the response was
given instantaneously. As the angle is larger, the subject's response slows
down in a liner relation to the size of the angle.
Even though the existence of cognitive representations is to a large
degree established as a facti, there is still the question of their attributes and
there is no general theory on cognitive representations (Palmer, 1978). This is
not the place for a complete review, therefore two contributions are selected due
to their relevance for this work. The first of these addresses itself to the
representation of knowledge, which is conceived of as several different types
or modalities, making it particularly interesting for reallife settings like that of
strategic management. The other perspective concerns representations of
problems. A problem representation is seen as a space of behavioral
alternatives relative to a particular stimulus-situation. The value of this
perspective lies in its focus on 'real time' problem solving.
One of the most persistently found and agreed upon distinction of
knowledge representations is that between the declarative and procedural mode
(Winograd, 1975). Declarative knowledge is facts about events and things,
their relations, and states of the world. Procedural knowledge, on the other
i The critisicm is mostly to be found with orthodox behaviorists. However, the
general trend in behaviorism seems to be in the direction of integrating cognitive
representations within its theory system.
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hand, is knowledge about how to perform various activities. Initially, due to
the AI (Artificial Intelligence) background of this concept, the acivities referred
to were those related to the storage and retrieval of information (Barr, &
Feigenbaum, 1981; Winograd, 1975). Researchers in this tradition pointed out
that data do not constitute knowledge of themselves; they must be accessible for
processing. As computer databases grew larger, techniques of information
retrieval became very important. Without effective storage systems and
retrieval routines the data would simply not be found in a reasonable span of
time. It was soon realized that human subjects would need some similar kind
of systems, which came to be known as 'procedural knowledge'. With time,
there has been a need to account for the storage of behavioral skills in a more
general sense, like for instance pouring a cup of tea, leading a marketing
campaign or even formulating strategies. Procedural knowledge therefore has
also come to comprise such elaborate behavior routines.
One other quite concensual distinction is that between modal specific
perception-based representations as for example memories that can be recalled
with all the richness of the senses like sounds, smells and visualizations, and
nonspecific meaning-based symbolic representations (Anderson, 1985; Paivio,
1971; Russel, 1921). The central point here, although the actual formulations
differ, is that some representations seem to retain all the richness of sense data
while the other kind of representation are of a more semantic and lexical kind.
Thus, three categories may be discerned: 1) modal and 2) non-modal
representations, and 3) procedural representations (fig. 2.2.).
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REPRESENT AnONS
I
I
Procedural
I
Declarative
I
I
Modal
I
Non-modal
Fig. 2.2.: Taxonomy of Cognitive Representations
This three-partite scheme was proposed by Tulving (1983; 1985) in a
slightly different conceptualization. The focus here is on the propositional
(declarative) representations, which was argumented to be best conceived of as
a system with two subsystems; episodic (corresponding roughly to the modal)
and semantic (corresponding to the nonmodal) representations. In addition, the
category of procedural representations was retained, but defined broadly in
terms of skills and behavior. A number of distinguishing characteristics
between propositional and procedural representations may be delineated:
Propositional knowledge may be demonstrated through many different means,
like speech, writing, discourse and art. Procedural knowledge can only be
demonstrated through the performance of skill. Propositional knowledge may
be true or false relative to an empirical reality, while procedural representations
are neither true nor false. Propositional representations demand directive
attention while procedural knowledge is best performed automatically. While
propositional representations may be acquired on a brief occasion, procedural
representations are acquired through extensive practise because it is learned
connections between complex stimulipatterns and response chains, which
enable skillful adaptation to complex environments. The focus here is clearly
on skilled performance attained through experience and practise.
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Episodic and semantic representations differ, in general terms, with
regard to a) the kinds of information processed, b) characteristics of their
operation and c) their applications. In episodic memory it is information
identified with self that is represented. The subject will recall this kind of
memories as self-related episodes with external references. These are the
episodes typically evoced when subjects are interviewed about 'critical
incidents'. Semantic representations, on the other hand, have only cognitive
references. They do not imply personal experiences, but conceptual
understanding. If I think of myself posting my letters at the post office, it is an
episodic representation. If, on the other hand, I recall the address of the same
post office, it would be a semantic representation. Episodic representations
may be called 'remembering' as contrasted with semantic representations which
are more like 'knowledge'. Again, with semantic representations it is possible
to internally represent states of the world not perceptually present; as models
that can be operated upon without overt behavior. This makes it possible to test
hypotheses without behavioral commitment. Episodic memory adds the
capability to 'travel back' in time for the utilization of personally experienced
events in real time situations.
2.2.1. Episodic memory and managers
Since it is reasonable to conceive of managers as 'human', they also would be
assumed to have episodic representations. The obvious question is if it has any
significance for their work, and if it has; what? As far as I know, there are no
studies to answer this particular question. On the other hand, there are some
observations which may hint at the direction the answers may take.
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Most researchers will consent that knowledge of the field 'strategic
management' and problem solving/decision making are valuable assets in
strategic management. This is, after all, a dominant part of the curriculum of
most business schools. However, there has been raised some doubts lately by
practitioners as well as theorists (Leavitt, 1989; Peters, & Waterman, 1982)
about this practise. While conceptual models at a high level abstraction is
necessitated by a complex environment (as evidenced by the success of
operations research applied to marketing and finance), it is evidently
insufficient in a world of strategic action. Why is this so? In relation to
strategic issue formulation, we are in position to suggest the following
answers. First, strategy in action is dispositions in a real world of real people,
real organizations and real firms, all with their distinctive qualities and patterns
of reaction and interaction. While knowledge of general principles are often
helpful, they may also be insufficient as well as of disadvantage in real action,
because there are always exceptions as well as effective short cuts in reality not
accounted for in conceptual terms. Episodic memory with its potentially rich
database on the domain in focus may be the missing link here, although in
some 'pre-conceptual' format. Second, this type of memory may be a
prerequisite for the flexible problem formulation activity referred to as
innovation, which was implied by a series of studies on problem finding
(Getzels, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1965; Getzels, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).
When observing individuals in the process of formulating problems, originality
was found to correspond closely to the degree of energy invested in exploring
and gathering concrete perceptual data about the objects in focus. This
conclusion is also reached by (Greeno, & Simon, 1988): "(the creative)
solution of problems can be strongly influenced by quite low-level perceptual
factors" (p. 76). Or, in the words of another author, addressing managers: "To
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assess the value of historical, aggregated, 'hard' MIS information, consider
two of the manager's prime use for his information-to identify problems and
opportunities and to build his own mental models of the things around him
(eg., how his organization's budget-system works, how his customers by his
product, how changes in the economy affect his organization, an so on). Every
bit of evidence suggests that the manager identifies decision situations and
builds models not with the aggregated abstractions a MIS provides, but with
specific tidbits of data" (Mintzberg, 1975:218). Third, human subjects have
been demonstrated to possess very rich and complete records of their
experiences from childhood and up (Penfield, 1959). Even though such
knowledge may not be conscious it probably influences the way one perceives
and frames issues of the world in general (Freud, 1974). Therefore, one has
reason to expect that managers' earlier experiences influence the way they
construe the organization's strategic situation. Lastly, first-hand experience
with a certain domain of events and problems probably short-circuits the
tendency to biased perception following abstract conceptualization. Some of
the research on mental set may be interpreted in this direction (Haukedal,
1989).
Episodic memory then, may serve as a phenomenological resource for
semantic development, adjustment and change. When for example a manager
experiences a novel situation, he may search his episodic representation for
experiences with some kind of correspondence to the actual one, work on it
conceptually and integrate it with his existing semantic representation. Thus he
may gain some new insight and even reach a new level of awareness through
the dual operation of episodic and semantic representations. This is a kind of
reasoning which is in line with the view of memory proposed by Schank and
Abelson (1977:17)
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In addition to serving as a store of cognitive 'raw material' for
semantic processing, episodic memory may also be a source of analoguous
situations that the individual may apply to a particular situation, which is
demonstrated to be a powerful formulation strategy in solving problems (Gick,
& Holyoak, 1980). There is some evidence that managers do this to a greater
extent than people with less experience in this field (Isenberg, 1986), when
working with business problems. Thus, an actual case may be matched to a
situation stored in memory and solved by using elements from this recalled
situation.
2.2.2. Semantic memory and managers
Semantic memory is closely related to language: "It is a mental thesaurus,
organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal
symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about
rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulations of these symbols,
concepts, and relations" (Tulving, 1972:386). In this memory, stimuli have no
autobiographical references; only semantic. It deals with abstract facts, like the
category a stimulus belong to, its relation to other things or events, its probable
frequency and the like.
The primary function of semantic memory, apart from its obvious
importance for language, is that it adds the capability for construction of models
of the world. Such models may be used for analysis, testing and
experimentation without commitment to behavioral acts (Kelly, 1955). One can
even operate on states of the world not actually experienced, or in 'real'
existence for that matter. If episodic representations are 'memories', semantic
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representations are best characterized as 'knowledge'. This may be knowledge
about the world, as for example knowledge about one's firm or organization,
its relation to the environment and the events determining its operation.
Content. It may be helpful to analyze managers' semantic representations
from the perspective of their content on the one hand and structure on the other.
Content refers here to the concepts making up the representation, their types
and semantic referrals. We will have more to say about this after discussing the
experience variable, but given that knowledge representations reflect the
events, situations and environments exposed to, it seems obvious that the
content of managers' semantic representations will reflect their particular
experience base as well as some kind of abstract level concepts related to this
field of experience.
Structure. Structure refers here to how the concepts are 'tied together', thus
making up more or less organized semantic representations. Several structural
schemes have been offered in the literature but there are as yet no consensus on
which one to adopt (Anderson, 1983; Barr, & Feigenbaum, 1981). On the
other hand there seem to be a shared belief that this kind of representation is
made up of units (e.g. concepts, nodes, primitive, variables, propositions,
schemata), connections between them (e.g. associations, probabilistic
connections, causal relations) and that these elements together may form
structures of varying degrees of complexity and organization. Cause
relationships may be of particular interest concerning this type of
representations when it comes to managers, because of the instrumental nature
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of their work which implies knowledge of means and ends-or causal
structures (Hall, 1984; Maruyama, 1982; Salancik, & Porac, 1986). Causal
relations are generally conceived to take place between variables subjectively
held to be of importance for a particular phenomenon (Maruyama, 1982;
Weick, & Bougon, 1986). These variables may be seen as categories
bracketed out of an otherwise continuous stream of sensory data. Therefore the
variables themselves, being the building blocks of cognitive maps, are also of
considerable interest. Some research has been conducted on managerial
categories (Dutton, & Jackson, 1987; Porac, & Thomas, 1988) demonstrating
the value of this approach.
Again, the particulars of the structural nature of managers' semantic
memories will have be postponed till the discussion of experience. Still, when.-
formulating strategic issues, managers will have to refer to their semantic
representation, or conceptual models, of their organization and its environments
(Pounds, 1969). Thus, their strategic thinking is influenced by the content as
well as structure of this representational mode.
2.2.3. Procedural memory and managers
The third kind of representations are called procedural (Tulving, 1985). In
contrast to the other two forms of representation reviewed above, this mode is
knowledge about process. For reasons discussed below, it is also probably
best understood as consisting of different levels.
Historically, the distinction between static and procedural
representations go back to the discussion in the field of AI on declarative vs.
procedural knowledge (Winograd, 1975). Here, one was occupied with the
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issue of whether knowledge had any value at all if it could not be found or
accessed (Anderson, 1985; Barr, & Feigenbaum, 1981; Lindsay, & Norman,
1977). This issue is no longer very actively debated, as one has come to
recognize that all data are dependent upon some kind of processual activity in
order to be operable.
As noted earlier, procedural representations may also be conceived of
in a more general sense. Procedural memory may be seen as the retained
learned connections between stimuli and responses, and is a kind of
prescriptive blueprints, or plans, for action. In this interpretation of procedural
representation, the concept of level has great importance. Consider for example
the strategic act of 'venturing into a new market'. On a very abstract level, this
amounts to recognizing the opportunity of doing so. On a more concrete level,
something more substantial has do be done in order to materialize the act. This
might be formulating a proposal of the strategy, which translates into such
mundane behaviors as finding a piece of paper and even engaging in the minute
sensory-motor motions of writing it up (Powers, 1973; Powers, 1978).
Procedural representations, then, are about skills somehow stored in
memory. As noted, such skills may be at different levels of abstraction nested
within each other (Carver, & Scheier, 1981; Powers, 1973). Managerial work
may be described in terms of skills that mediate between input- and output
variables (Yukl, 1981). Examples of these are problem solving skills (March,
& Simon, 1958), skills in structuring work processes (Fiedler, 1986), decision
making skills (Vroom, & Yetton, 1973) and social skills (Mayo, 1945). As is
clear from this list, the question of levels becomes valuable as soon as one goes
from mere labelling to analysis of the skill in question. If this is correct, one
may speculate that experience endows managers with a certain repertoire of
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skills as well as foolproof and automatically executable low-level routines of
execution of these skills.
The best sustained discussion of such representations are those of
scripts (Schank, & Abelson, 1977). These are generalized cognitive schemas
relating to well known behavioral situations. Scripts share the characteristics
of skills discussed above, and adds the notion of default values and
mechanisms for acquisition: When encountering a new situation, scripts are of
value because they 'fill in' information for interpretation of the situation, and
routines for execution of behavior, when needed. This prepares for flexibility
through generalizability of skills as well as effective learning by experience and
economy of attention.
Managerial work is heavily biased towards action (Kotter, 1982;
Mintzberg, 1973). Therefore the procedural representations may be of
particular value in this context. In relation to strategic issue formulation, claims
as to what should be done as well as the perception of key elements, like
competitors' behavior and what it means, would rest on this kind of cognitive
representations. For example, on learning that a major customer is playing golf
with a competitor the manager may interpret this as a threat or not according to
the script invoked. The same script specifies also actions to engage in, as for
example to offer new incentives to the customer.
What is suggested here is that environmental images consist of
multimodal knowledge pertaining to strategy-related domains. Having
knowledge is, however, not the same as applying it. Next section introduces
some concepts of value for analyzing these images' operative characteristics.
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENT AL IMAGES
28
2.2.4. Representations as problem spaces
Problem solving is frequently described in terms of searching a problem space
(Newell, & Simon, 1972)..which consists of representations of the elements of
the situation, the goal, actions and strategies that can be undertaken in working
on the problem and constraints; restrictions on what can be done and limits on
how elements may be combined (Greeno, & Simon, 1988).
The initial situation of the problem solver is referred to as the initial
state, the situations on the way to the goal as intermediate states, and the goal as
the goal state. The actions undertaken in trying to reach the goal state are called
operators, and they are seen as behaviors transforming the problem space from
one state to another. Formulating a problem may itself be seen as a problem
solving activity, where the perception of a strategic stimulus is the initial state,
the successive efforts as operators transforming the initial state, and the
strategic issue is the goal state.
Given this conceptualization, a subject's knowledge and experience
with the problem domain obviously have significance for how effectively the
goal state (Le. strategic issue) is reached and its qualities defined. For
example, a given stimulus may be recognized from earlier experience which
allows recall of stored paths through the 'problem space' to a proofed goal state
(Le. formulation of issue).
This conceptualization of cognitive representation must be perceived
as complementary rather than an alternative to the tripartite division discussed
above. While the former system focuses on the nature of knowledge
representation itself, the latter is rather a way to conceptualize problem
representation. Thus, a manager may face a strategic stimulus (which, in
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problem solving terms would be the initial state), search his semantic and/or
episodic memory for relevant elements and contstraints, then apply actions and
strategies from procedural memory to reach the goal state (strategic issue)2.
When the stimuli confronting the individual are well-known, then the task may
be simply to narrow the problem space as much as possible to effectively reach
the solution (goal state), which may be simply to choose one of several known
problem- or strategic issue- categories (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981;
Dutton, & Jackson, 1987). On the other hand, when the stimuli are
unrecognized, ambiguous or weak (as is often the case in strategic situations)
the task may be better described as an expansion of the problem space
(Volkema, 1983) and the designing of a solution. In such circumstances it is
conceivable that the episodic memory is accessed for bringing in additional
material.
These points are better appreciated when seen in the light of some
basic principles of information-processing theory as applied to human thinking
(for a detailed discussion see Ericsson, & Simon (1984); Newell, & Simon
(1972». The different states ofthe knowledge space reached by the subject are
then the result of operators applied to knowledge held in short-term memory
(STM), by bringing in new information from long term memory (LTM) or
external sources. The subjects' verbalization correspond to some part of the
information currently held in STM. In other words, the representation of
problem situations are directly related to the material which is brought into
STM. This should become especially apparent when the external source of
information is scarce, since one has to rely all the more on internal sources of
2 Of course, the subject will also search the external environment for such data if
Chapter 2: ENVIRONMENT AL IMAGES
30
information. The other implication of this model of human problem solving is
associated with the reliance on STM. It is well known that the information
processing capacity of STM is severely limited (Miller, 1956). This fact is
cause for perceptual filters (Hedberg, 1981; Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg,
1978) and a range of cognitive heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982) which, on the one hand make it possible to relate to a complex world
with limited resources, but on the other hand are reason for misperception,
oversimplified and often quite wrong interpretations. There are, however,
some research indicating that experience with a particular domain make one less
susceptible for such biases through a more effective use of one's cognitive
representations. This will be the theme for the next chapter.
•
2.2.5. Summary
Environmental images may be conceptualized as cognitive representations of
environment, being a multimodal and composite subset of knowledge held in
LTM. As such, EI may be understood as a schema (Schwenk, 1988) particular
for strategic contexts, that the subject applies to strategy related problems. This
structure integrates bits of knowledge and problem space elements like
operators, strategies and goals. As such, environmental images are probably
developed through practise and experience with strategy related work.
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Experience and Managerial Thought
We get better at things by practising. This is a quite straight forward
observation that has recently been taken as point of departure for the analysis of
skilled behavior in a whole range of fields. One emerging fact is that through
experience one developes knowledge-based strategies for problem solving in
order to bypass the limitations of STM. Research on especially talented
problem solvers, for example, invariably indicates that they are particularly
efficient in the formulation of the problem at hand. In this stage, they draw
upon their extensive experience to produce problem representations that later
score high on efficiency and originality. In the following, we will explore this
concept and some relevant findings further.
In formulating problems, a person has to rely both on internal and
external sources of information. Thus, his level and organization of relevant
knowledge becomes a topic of great interest. In other domains, such as chess-
playing, computer programming, electronic and medical diagnosing, it has been
found that individuals with a degree of experience compatible with the label
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'expertise' may be characterized by the general trait of efficient organization and
utilization of large knowledge bases. Whether this also holds true for managers
has not been studied yet, but there is reason to believe that this is so.
3.1. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
Expertise is a fuzzy concept. It is hard to find authors in this field venture on a
definition of the construct. Some help may, however, be found in the
concept's etymology. The tenn 'expert' is derived from the Latin word
expertus, itself derived for experiri which means 'to make full trial of' (Skeat,
1972). From this, and other etymological connections, the term seems to con-
vey something close to 'thoroughly tried knowledge'. This, of course, is close
to the general conception of expertise; a person that has reached a level of
special proficiency in a particular domain through 'hands on' experience.
Anderson (1985) takes this idea as a point of departure when
accounting for expertise. Assuming that we all have reached such a level in
some activities, at least in speaking a language or driving a car, he goes on to
place expertise in a perspective of skill acquisition where such a proficiency
marks the highest level. This level (and therefore expertise) is characterized by
the fact that the skill in question has become automatic and very rapid. Such
skills are not confined to everyday activities like speaking and driving,
however. Therefore, expertise has been studied in a wide range of activities
not usually associated with our basic preoccupations.
Though it is possible to agree upon the meaning content of the label
'expert' it is much more difficult to establish an external standard on which to
decide who are and who are not experts. In practical life, this problem is
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solved by resorting to peer evaluation (examples of this is the evaluation of
academics and the acknowledgement of Masters in European guild systems).
In research on expertise, the problem has largely been met by utilizing
individuals with long practise in a particular field as subjects e.g. (Chi,
Feltowich & Glaser, 1981). In view of the difficulties involved in defining
expertise appropriately, it is probably best to think of the phenomenon as a
continuum. Therefore, individuals may exhibit more or less of the traits
associated with expertise, according to their degree and length of involvement
with a particular problem domain. Therefore, the empirical findings and
theoretical discussions on expertise may be viewed as indications of
performance levels and not of one particular category of human beings.
The literature on expertise seems to be growing steadily. What started
as analysis of artificial intelligence has now developed into a study of expertise
in applied domains like medical diagnosis, shoplifting and consumer behavior.
The findings on expertise may broadly be described as dimensions of amount
and organization of knowledge on the one hand, and its utilization on the other.
Here I will present some salient features of experts' knowledge in qualitative as
well as quantitative terms.
3.2. CONTEXTUALKNOWLEDGE
There seems to be no doubt in the literature that expertise involves having more
knowledge (Chi, Feltowich, & Glaser, 1981; Egan, & Schwartz, 1979; Fiske,
Kinder, & Larter, 1983; Greeno, & Simon, 1988). Since expertise is a domain
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specific trait (Chase, & Simon, 1973b), this means that experts' representations
are characterized by relatively larger bases of knowledge specific to their field.
This rather trivial fact actually turns some long held conceptions about
human intelligence inside out. For example, the powers of logic and reasoning
have enjoyed a high status as hallmarks of intelligent thinking. Actually, expen
performance seems to rest on rather different mechanisms like pattern-
recognition, application of well-learned procedures and recollection of stored
knowledge (Chase, & Simon, 1973a; Chase, & Simon, 1973b; Fiske, Kinder,
& Larter, 1983; Greeno, & Simon, 1988; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, &
Simon, 1980; Lesgold, Feltovich, Glaser, & Wang, 1981; Newell, & Simon,
1972; Simon, & Gilmanin, 1973). The explanation is that the expen has
knowledge about the focal type (Chi, 1981) of stimuli, their constraints, and
their probable causes (Lesgold, 1981) as well as outcomes given specific
interventions (Chase, & Simon, 1973b). This knowledge may be applied
directly to relevant situations, thereby shon-circuiting the need for elaborate
reasoning. Clearly, this is a more economical way of thinking than engaging in
laborious reasoning processes from scratch. Still, it must be remembered that
this kind of processing presupposes years of intensive practise in a given
As argumented above, extensive contextual, or domain specific,
knowledge is the basis for expen performance. Some authors have hinted to
such knowledge in accounting for strategic performance. Mintzberg and
Waters (1984) were very explicit on this point when discussing the
3 Hayes (1981) suggests that at least ten years of intensive experience in the field
is necessary.
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entrepreneur of a-successful strategic turnaround: "A further point that emerged
clearly in this study is that the key to generating such a vision [i.e. strategy
formulation], and to changing it at the right time is intimate, detailed knowledge
of the business. In discussing his firm's competitive advantage, Sam Steinberg
(a successful entrepreneur) told us: "Nobody knew the grocery business like
we did. Everything has to do with your knowledge". He added, "I knew
merchandise, I knew costs, I knew selling, I knew customers, I knew
everything ...and I passed on all my knowledge; I kept teaching my people.
That's the advantage we had. They could not touch us" (p. 64).
There seems to be reason to expect well developed knowledge
representations relative to the domain of concern with experienced managers,
and that this furthers better strategy formulations. It goes without saying that
experience in a domain endows one with a lot of varied knowledge of the
episodic type. The constant need to translate strategic stimuli into issues make
it reasonable to expect development of the repertoire of semantic constructs
specific for the managerial field also (Randall, 1977). The same demands
should also secure a well developed adroitness of what to do and how to do it,
contingent upon various situational characteristics. In other words, one would
expect experienced strategists to exhibit a relatively distinct problem space
when working on strategic problems or stimuli, due to the development of all
three modes of representation.
The properties, related to knowledge, of experts' cognitive
representations are addressed in two lines of research. For one thing, analysis
of chess masters' performance indicate that they have at their disposal a
substantial mass of 'if-then' connections (or what is called productions)
(Chase, & Simon, 1973a; Chase, & Simon, 1973b; Simon, Gilmartin, 1973).
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These are stored procedures to engage in given a certain condition or set of
conditions, and the more such structures that are stored and accessible the better
will be the performance due to the lesser need for processing capacity. One
other set of studies have demonstrated that effectivity in processing may also be
explained by the organization of representations around inferences about
principles and abstractions subsuming concrete objects and events (Chi,
Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982). These are principles
not apparent in the problem situations, and must therefore be stored in the
problem solvers' LTM. These studies have something to say about what to
expect with regard to the kind of knowledge experienced problemsolvers have
that make them more efficient than those less experienced. They do not,
however, adress the issue of representational modes.
3.3. LEVELS
The idea that cognitive processes and content are organized according to levels
has a somewhat complex background. On the one hand, it is well known and
not a quite newone (Bartlett, 1941). On the other hand, the idea creeps into
discussions on cognition here and there (Broadbent, 1977; Lindsay, &
Norman, 1977; Powers, 1973; Powers, 1978) and seems to have a kind of
general acceptance. Here, it is the cognitive representations of individuals that
are in focus. Therefore, the concept of levels of cognitive content will be
discussed in the following.
In a line of research on the control of behavior, standards of
performance is held to be organized hierarchically in levels (Carver, & Scheier,
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1981; Powers, 1973; Powers, 1978). The higher levels, in these authors'
view, are cognitive structures in the fonn of values or perceived norms and
programs prescribing behavior to accomplish these goals. The concept of
cognitive schema also embodies this idea. It has been noted, for example, that
these cognitive units may be nested within each other, making otherwise
complex processing ofinfonnation less demanding (Rumelhart, 1980), because
of the structural net of associations inherent in such an architecture. Categories
are also held to be organized by levels of abstraction. Studying natural
categories of ethnic groups, Brent (1978), for example, identified as many as
six different levels of category abstraction. All these levels are, however,
probably not of equal importance. It has been argued (Rosch, Mervis, Gray,
Johnsen, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) that what has been called the basic level
(Rosch, 1978) is used more frequently than others. The reason behind this is
that this level carries the most information about the environment. This level
represent an intermediate degree of generality with an optimal number of
attributes, making it rich enough for perceiving a complex environment and yet
simple enough for processing by limited cognitive resources, as well as
corresponding to 'natural' units of phenomena (Rosch, Mervis, Gray,
Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). One recent study of managerial
categorisation of organizational forms (Porac, & Thomas, 1988) demonstrated
that their categories were indeed organized hierarchically and that their
conceptualizations centered around "an infonnation-rich middle level of
abstraction" (p. 25).
This vertical organization of categories according to levels, in addition
to other findings, resulted in a maladaptively narrow definition of the
competitive environment (Porac, & Thomas, 1988). However, the
hierarchically structured knowledge may also be argued to enhance the
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processing of complex data. It has been suggested that experience with a
particular domain result in the integration of knowledge at different levels of
abstraction into tree-like hierarchical structures (Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983;
McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981). This kind of association would
make it easy for the experienced individual to shuttle between theoretical
principles and their particular exemplars at the "real life" level. Therefore, they
should be better at perceiving underlying patterns of a given phenomenon,
which greatly enhances diagnostic skills (Lesgold, 1984; Lesgold, Feltovich,
Glaser, & Wang). In addition, this kind of structure makes possible rapid
association between features of the concrete problem situation and the more
general problem categories, thus giving access to a repertoire of 'proof'
methods and procedures for solving the problem (see also Weaver & Carrol,
1984). While not pursuing the theme of integration, SeInes and Troye (1988)
report some results supporting the idea of levels of knowledge. They
,
demonstrate that some conflicting findings on the relationship between
cognitive complexity and information search may be reconciled by viewing the
data according to the level of knowledge, or expertise, as are their particular
focus.
With the above discussion as point of departure, it seems valuable to
distinguish between at least four levels of knowledge concerning strategic
management:
Level I: Knowledge about a particular organization and its domain of
action.
Level II: Knowledge about a particular industry.
Level ID: Knowledge of strategic management in general
Level IV: Knowledge of theories addressingstrategy and strategic
management.
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The first level refers to events and facts relative to one particular firm
or organization. This may be significant events, knowledge of standard
operating procedures, goals, how things are done in a specific organization,
important people, salient competitors and customers, its products etc. The
second level concerns knowledge about a particular industry's level of
competition, its significant actors and their characteristic behavior patterns, the
products' stage in the life cycle, customer characteristica etc. The third level
consists of context-free ideas and principles pertaining to the field of strategy
and adaption to environment generally. This may be ideas about such things as
competitors and their actions, economy issues and administrative matters
(internal environment). The fourth level consists of the theory domain of
strategic management: concepts and principles, and their interrelationships.
While the two lowest levels may be viewed as concrete exemplars of abstract
categories, the third level consists of the categories themselves, their attributes
and relationships between those categories and their attributes. In this
perspective, the fourth level may be seen as sets of rules relating the categories
to each other.
Experience may influence this structure of levels in several ways.
First of all, one would expect level1 and 2 to be quantitatively developed as a
function of experience. It is quite possible to gain a good working insight into
a particular organization and/or an industry by attending to the press, doing
study and monitoring other sources of information. On the other hand,
experiential involvement with an organization or industry obviously exposes
one to more data about these domains. One would also, by the same line of
reasoning, assume a qualitative development of these two levels as a function
of experience since length and degree of involvement would expose one to
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other kinds of data in addition to more of it. The third and fourth levels are less
clear concerning the effect of experience. On the one hand, studies of experts
have demonstrated that they do indeed have greater knowledge of general
principles as well as theories than others. But this is hardly surprising in view
of the fact that the experts studied have largely been professors in fields like
physics and mathematics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott,
Simon, & Simon, 1980). The issue is probably less clear when it comes to
more 'applied' fields like strategic management. This is, after all, an extremely
action-oriented profession, and studies of leaders repeatedly find that they
spend little or no time in the kind of activity associated with theoretical analyses
(Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973). Moreover, anecdotal data suggest that
theoretical knowledge of business strategy are viewed with some degree of
wariness, at best, by many managers. In sum, then, empirical studies of
experts in other fields suggest that a thorough command of theoretical
principles is associated with experience, but the generality of this findings to
the field of strategic management is uncertain.
3.4. SUMMARYMODEL
As indicated, EIs are probably best conceptualized as a kind of cognitive
schemas for cognitive processing of strategy-related information. They contain
relevant information in several representational modes. Experience is
postulated to further the development of EI in regard to amount of knowledge
accumulated, its complexity and structural organization. This development, in
tum, is assumed to lead to more effectively formulated strategic issues through
better exploitation of the limited capacity of STM. This line of argument is
illustrated in fig. 3.5.
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Fig. 3.5.: Conceptual Model
The model should be read as follows: Environmental images are
subsets of individuals' long term memory. They are developed as integrated
structures of the three representational modes through experience, in a
particular domain of action. These images are accessed by operations in STM
Chapter 3: EXPERIENCE AND MANAGERIAL THOUGHT·
42
when responding to strategic stimuli. The results of those routines, which are
held in STM as successive states of the processes; may be verbalized. The
verbalizations correspond, in this study, to the verbal protocol. Several points
of importance should be noted with respect to the model. For one thing, EIs
are developed relative to a particular sphere of experience. Second,
development here means enrichment of the contents of the three representational
modes and their integration. Third, the semantic mode is held to be central
relative to the others, because it is here conceptual modelling of the
environment must occur. This modelling, or symbolic manipulation, of the
environment may be the essential key to understand managerial behavior. As
for the other two modes, they are conceptualized as supporting systems relative
to the semantic. As argued earlier, episodic material may serve as a repertoir of
experiences that can be coded or recoded by the semantic representational
mode. Procedural material, on the other hand, serve as a repertoir of
procedures to follow in order to implement plans and as a source of schemas or
prototypes for recognizing situations, especially those with strong elements of
transactional contents. Fourth, the verbalizations are seen as completetely
contingent on the content of short term memory (STM). Fifth, the EIs are
activated by strategic stimuli. Last, the verbalizations, or output in the form of
strategic issues perceived and elaborated on, are contingent upon the processes
in and between the EI and STM. Consequently, the quality of the output will
also depend on those cognitive processes and structures.
Chapter 3: EXPERIENCE AND MANAGERIAL THOUGHT
CHAPTER 4
Hypotheses
As indicated, this study addresses the relation between experience and
environmental images through the analysis of verbal protocols. These data are
held to be the result of processes and content of the subjects' short term
memory (STM) at the time ofprotocol production (Ericsson, & Simon, 1984).
This processing, and its content, is based on the subjects' EI which is being
accessed at the time of protocol production. Some hypotheses for empirical
testing of the expected relationships between these data are offered below. The
hypotheses are formulated with regard to the protocols, and not the EI
themselves, because cognitive entities are by their nature not observable. By
analyzing the verbal output, however, one learns about the properties of the EI
held to produce the verbalizations.
Hypothesis 1 builds on the discussion of the episodic mode and the
importance of an extensive base for advanced cognitive behavior, together with
the belief that experienced problems-solvers' cognition is more integrated than
that of the inexperienced. Hypothesis 2 focuses upon the procedural
representational mode, and otherwise builds upon the same principles as Hl.
Hypotheses 3,4 and 5 adress issues related to the semantic representational
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mode. Those hypotheses also build upon the same premises as the HI and H2,
in addition to the principle of levels.
HYPOTHESIS 1
Experienced strategists' verbal protocols will contain more
statements referring to episodic material than those of the
inexperienced.
As will be recalled, it was argued that there is reason to think of cognitive
representations as a composite of three different modes of operation (Paivio,
1986; Tulving, 1972; Tulving, 1985; Winograd, 1975). One of them is the
episodic, which basically is memory of personally related events, and other
non-verbal representations. Having such representations is a general cognitive
property equal to all. Basically, therefore, variations in verbalizations referring
to such representations should reflect either differences in communicative style
or situational demands.
On the other hand, people with experience in the strategy domain
should have more episodic material relevant for this kind of practise at their
disposal. This is based on the rather prosaic observation that spending time in
a certain environment exposes one to stimuli particular for that domain. While
there is no reason to expect all those stimuli to result in conceptual processing
and learning, they probably are stored in some preconceptual (episodic) form as
memories (Penfield, 1959). In addition, such material should be more
available due to priming effects well known from associative studies (Meyer, &
Schvaneveldt, 1971). The importance of availability, and the role of episodic
material in making information available, are well documented in studies of
cognitive heuristics (Tversky, & Kahneman, 1973). Having more of relevant
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episodes stored in memory, and these being primed through constantly relating
to this problem domain in practical use, one would expect experience to result
in higher frequencies of referrals to episodic content when solving problems of
this domain. It has, for instance, been demonstrated that managers rely on
analoguous reasoning to a greater degree than students when working on
business cases (Isenberg, 1986), which may be interpreted as an indication of
use of episodic material.
When the individuals access their episodic content in LTM, the chosen
material is represented in STM and may be given semantic form. These data
may then be verbalized by the individual, and there is reason to believe that
verbal protocols are valid indicators of STM material (Ericsson, & Simon,
1980). Therefore, one expects a higher incidence of episodic content in the
protocols of experienced strategists relative to the novices. To my knowledge,
there are no studies addressing this particular relationship. At the same time,
the general interaction between the two modes of representation referred to has
been suggested elsewhere (Paivio, 1986). Therefore, the empirical
investigation of the suggested relationship between experience and the
enhanced integration of episodic and semantic memory has some interest in a
wider theoretical context as well as the strategy management field.
To sum it all up, there is reason to believe that experience is associated
with a higher incident of episodic material in the verbal protocol. This is of
interest because it would be an indication of a more developed episodic
representational memory, and/or a better integration between this mode and the
semantic.
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HYPOTHESIS 2
Experienced strategists' verbal protocols will contain more
statements referring to procedural material than those of the
inexperienced.
The access to episodic content is of interest because of the opportunity for
development of the semantic representation offered by such an association.
Procedural representations are of interest here because of the highly action-
oriented nature of managerial work (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973).
Procedural representations may be thought of as scripts, or programs, for
behavioral acts (Bartlett, 1941; Carver, & Scheier, 1981; Powers, 1973;
Schank, & Abelson, 1977). These acts may be motorically simple and have
short time-spans, like for instance signing a letter. Other, and more important
procedures are very difficult to describe, not to mention prescribe, because their
optimal form is simply not known. On the other hand, some of the scripts
managers engage in are known by their labels. Some examples are: Building
networks, motivating people, managing projects and planning.
Through a relevant education one may learn about the kind of
procedures constituting a large part of strategic management. There are,
however, several problems associated with this learning relative to the real
world. First, there is seldom any learning of procedures at all. Usuallyone
learns principles: Under what circumstances will this and that have so and so
consequences; what is it all about; how did it develop; what is its relationship to
other parts of the field, etc. Business strategy as teached in the typical business
school is actually a good case in point. Inmost courses of this sort, the student
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will read about theories and models, get them illustrated through lectures and
even apply them to cases. Unfortunately, it is all verbal activities and more
often than not carefully distanced from particular contexts. What is learned,
then, is in large part about the labels and categories of procedures, and not the
procedures themselves. Second, very little is known about the procedures that
managers actually engage in. Further, the procedures that are known have a
low level of specificity. While there are some very few exceptions (see for
example Mintzberg, 1973) concerning managers, the specialized functions of
strategists have not been studied at all, in this context. In other words, little
is known about what procedures are central for strategists and even less is
known about their structure and how they should be executed.
When the educational system can't provide students with the proper
experiences to develop a repertoir of procedures relevant for management and
strategy related tasks, experience is the only alternative. Besides, even if
education could provide this learning, added experience should provide the
subject with a still greater quantity of procedures richer in detail and better
adapted to contextual constraints. The rationale for this conjecture lies in the
variation in situations met and consequences learned from acts in different
contingencies. Further, implementing intentions exposes one to a host of
practical details not captured in books and lectures.
In light of the above discussion, then, it is natural to expect an
association between experience and the development of procedural material.
Also, because of the action-dominated nature of managerial work, one would
expect such material to be more salient and better integrated with the semantic
mode, in the experienced group. Consequently, their protocols should be
richer in procedural content
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HYPOTHESIS 3
Experienced strategists' verbal protocols will contain more
statements reflecting contextual semantic-representational material
than those of the inexperienced.
As will be recalled, it was argued that the cognitive content may be seen as
organized in levels, and that the basis for expert cognition is an extensive
knowledge base. The essence of this hypothesis is that experienced managers
have more knowledge particular to their organization and industry (Levels I
and II), which is used actively when working on strategic problems. The
importance of this proposition lies in its implication for how a mind, practised
in a particular field, works. It is almost a truism that intelligence is a function
of general problem-solving techniques. Slowly, however, there is developing
the view that intelligent thinking may be better understood in terms of
knowledge-based cognitve strategies. As was indicated in the chapter on
expertise, skilled cognitive performance seems to be closely related to
recognition and matching of patterns to stored memory structures (Anderson,
1985; Chase, & Simon, 1973b; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser; Fiske, Kinder, &
Larter, 1983; Weaver, & Carrol, 1984): " .. .It is by no means obvious that very
smart people are that way directly because of the superior power of their
general methods--as compared with average people-A very intelligent person
might be that way because of specific local features of his knowledge-
organizing knowledge rather than because of global qualities of his 'thinking'"
(Minsky, & Papert, 1974:59). This is an important insight which, if it applies
to the managerial field, will have some consequences for how recruitment,
training and education of managers should be done. The point being made here
is that there may be a closer link between experience and intelligence than is
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usually appreciated, and that a higher value should be placed on intensive
practise in a given field. In recruiting managers, on should, perhaps, be more
attentive to their level of experience with the particular industry. In their
training, one of the goals should be to offer relevant experiences in a systematic
way.
Experienced decisionmakers and problemsolvers seem indeed, to a
large degree, to base their behavior upon a well-developed knowledge base
specific for their particular domain of practise (Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983).
This makes them less dependent on the relatively slow cognitive strategies of
general reasoning processes (Greeno, & Simon, 1988) and more general levels
of knowledge. While studies of physicists, mathematicians, physicians and
even shop-lifters support the conjecture of reliance on domain specific
knowledge, there are no studies of managers that are of immediate relevance
here. Still, there are some studies of managers that point in this direction and
that were cited earlier (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; Mintzberg, & Waters,
1984). The problem with these studies is that they are all of an impressionistic
and anecdotal nature, and the data are not available for verification. Therefore,
it is of interest to examine this relationship in a more controlled setting.
To the degree that their protocols are valid and reliable reflections of
the EIs, the content of those protocols should evidence a particular development
of the first two levels of representational abstraction, in the experienced
subjects group. The first level is developed as a function of working with a
particular organization. Such knowledge is important because it provides the
subject with the information on the 'nuts and bolts' of his/her firm, which in its
turn is necessary to appreciate its idiosyncratic domain of action. The second
level, which is knowledge about the industry in question is also naturally
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developed through working withing the industry. Every industry has its own
profile of elements such as products, markets and customers. In addition, they
all have their own history and potential for future development. These are data
which demand a certain time to gather and integrate. In other words, it takes
practise and experience to know a business in a competent way.
The particular relationship proposed here between contextual
knowledge and competence have been pointed out as a condition for applying
the powerful problem solving strategy called 'Working Forward' (Greeno, &
Simon, 1988). The use of this kind of strategy is one of the salient traits of
expert problem solvers. What has received less attention is some recent ideas
(see for example Minsky, & Papert, 1974) that such knowledge may be closer
associated with intelligence than generally allowed for. In other words,
intelligence may be understood in terms of the following function:
Intelligence = f (G x S) + CSK, where
G = General cognitive competency
S = Specific cognitive skills as for example verbal and
sensorimotor capabilities
CSK = Context specific knowledge
If this conceptualization of intelligence is accepted+, it follows that
having context specific knowledge will enhance cognitive processing relative to
a particular domain, even though intelligence is not completely contingent upon
it. Therefore, experienced managers should have an advantage relative to
inexperienced subjects, even though the two groups may be comparable
4 The CSK element account for the fact that intelligence tests are culture-specific
as well as fact that familiarity with a particular intelligence test result in a higher score.
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otherwise with regard to intelligence. In sum, there is reason to expect
experienced subjects' protocols to contain more context specific material than
those of the inexperienced.
HYPOTHESIS 4
Inexperienced subjects' verbal protocols will contain more
statements reflecting context free semantic-representational
material than those of the experienced.
As pointed out earlier, the concept of levels is important when discussing
human cognition, and it was argued that contextual knowledge may account for
some measure of skilled cognitive performance. Still, all situations cannot be
known by all, and human cognition can, after all, handle stimuli that have not
been met before. Therefore, there must be some mechanism one resorts to
when this is the case. Those mechanisms have been identified as general
problem solving strategies (Anderson, 1985), and have been referred to as
'Weak Methods' (Greeno, & Simon, 1989) because they are slow and
unreliable. One example of such strategies is that of working incrementally
towards states gradually resembling the desired goal. The attractive side of
these methods is that they do not rest on a base of domain specific knowledge.
All that is needed is some general frame of reference. For example, knowing
nothing about banks one can still analyze their environment by considering
competitors, potential product substitutes, movements in customer base etc.
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Context free knowledge, in this case general knowledge pertaining to
business strategy and applicable to all sorts of businesses (Level III), seems to
be a reasonable compensation for contextual knowledge. General principles,
concepts and systems are exactly the things schools are best at teaching,
according to prevalent opinions (see for example Leavitt, 1989). Therefore,
one is justified in expecting the inexperienced subjects to have this kind of
knowledge, as well as making use of it when working on the cases, in order to
compensate for the lack of more concrete information. Consequently, it is
reasonable to predict a higher incidence of statements reflecting context free
knowledge, relative to business strategy, in the inexperienced subjects'
protocols.
HYPOTHESIS 5
Inexperienced subjects' verbal protocols will contain more
statements reflecting theory-based semantic-representational
material than those of the experienced.
Experience certainly offers empirical support and authorization for positions
taken relative to the domain in question. This is of importance for the
following reason. A line of argument, of the sort met in the protocols, is
difficult to defend without some source of legitimization. If not explicitly
expressed, a tacit basis of this sort would still make the subject more
comfortable when arguing for his/her viewpoints. The experienced subjects
will probably possess this sort of basis in their background of exposures to real
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phenomena; they have first-hand experience from which they may argue. The
inexperienced subjects, on the other hand, lack this kind of background
relevant for the problems presented with in this study. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect them to resort to established theories, models and authors
of the field of business strategy (Level IV) instead. This is, after all, also an
accepted way of legitimizing arguments.
Theories also serve another function: They direct attention towards
relevant concepts and they help focus on central issues. As was argumented
earlier the experienced problem solvers probably have stored categories of
problem situations in their memory. When exposed to stimuli, they apply the
categories to the stimulus-situation and thereby gain access to strategies and
solution-standards proved to be effective in past events with similar attributes.
In other words, the experienced subjects doesn't need theories to the same
extent as the inexperienced. The latter group have not developed the same
repertoir of categories pertainting to strategic situations. Therefore they must
find support in the models and theories they know, in order to handle the new
situation cognitively. When facing a situation of declining market shares, for
example, the experienced subjects may respond with a similar case they have
been exposed to, frame the problem accordingly and pick out the salient
elements explaining the situation according to their stored interpretation of the
event. The inexperienced subjects, on the other hand, have no other choice
than applying theory-based knowledge to the problem.
In light of the discussion above, then, it is predicted that the
inexperienced subjects' verbal protocols will contain a higher incident of
referrals to theory than those of the experienced. This verbal behavior is taken
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to reflect, on behalf of the experienced group, EIs richer in contextual
experiential content and particularly adapted to strategy related issues.
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PART III
Research Design
and
Measurement

CHAPTER 5
Research Design and Datacollection
The hypotheses serve as directions for empirical investigation of the
relationship between experience and the environmental images. A discussion
of how the data are collected and analyzed follows.
5.1. REQUIREMENTS OF THE STUDY
The general idea of this study is to analyze the characteristics of experienced
strategists' environmental representations relative to novices'. The point of
departure is theories and concepts developed in other fields of study. The
study is focusing primarilyon theory-testing. The hypotheses are formulated
as propositions about relationsships between experience and certain cognitive
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characteristics. Therefore, the study is descriptive; the goal is to examine some
hypothesized relationships between strategy related experience and cognition.
The nature of a study has implications for which requirements it is
supposed to meet. In the case of theory-testing it has been suggested (Cook, &
Campell, 1979:83) that internal, construct, statistical conclusion and external
validity are given priority in that particular order, since it is impossible in
practise to attain the same high validity on all four dimensions in the same
study. Internal validity refers to the validity with which a relationship between
two variables are inferred as causal (see Cook and CampelI, 1979:37).
Through a study's design, internal validity may, in principle, be enhanced.
The present study, however, is of a descript~ve nature and the question of
causality is not pursued. This makes the problem of internal validity
redundant, given the definition of the term above. On the other hand, the
principle of internal validity as a check on a study's robustness with respect to
alternative interpretations of the relationships analyzed may be generalized to
other types of relationsships. Therefore, the present study will be analyzed
relative to its power in eliminating competing explanations.
Operationalization of the theoretical constructs is an important part of
controlling the construct validity of a study, and variance in the variables of a
study is a prerequisite for statistical analysis. Statistical conclusion validity is
related to the conclusions reached through statistical processing of the data-the
degree of confidence one can have in these conclusions given the constraints of
the statistical methods used relative to the datas' nature. Lastly, external
validity refers to the validity with which the findings can be generalized to
alternate measures, persons, settings and times (Cook, & Campell, 1979:37).
It is suggested here, then, that internal, construct and statistical conclusion
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validity are of the most central concern for this study. The observations noted
in this chapter makes the study's design (internal validity) and the
operationalization of the theoretical constructs (construct validity) significant,
along with the need for adequate variance for statistical processing.
In order to test the hypotheses empirically, within the validity
constraints indicated above, some requirements may be delineated. The first of
these is related to the design of the study, the second to the measurement of the
concepts and the third to the need for variance in the data. Relative to internal
validity, as conceived above, the study has to be designed so that it is possible
to isolate the variance in cognitive characteristics that is associated with
experience. How this is attained is discussed in the next section. Concerning
measurement, the hypotheses are formulated on the background of the expected
distribution of some specified cognitive characteristics according to level of
experience. These characteristics obviously have to be measured in order to be
tested for their relationships with experience. The question of construct validity
of these measures are dealt with in chapter 6, while the procedure of their
collection is described in the next section. Concerning variance, two groups of
research subjects were selected: One group of managers with strategy-related
experience and one group of students without this kind of experience. Since
the relationships focused upon by the hypotheses are all related to the variable
'experience', it was assumed necessary to polarize the variance here as much as
possible. The concrete sampling procedure is presented in the following.
The following sections are, together, a detailed account on how the
study was carried out together with a discussion of validity problems. The
chapter is then summed up with a discussion of the study's overall strengths
and weaknesses in relation to the validity concept.
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5.2. QUASI EXPERIMENT
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test hypotheses about the
characteristics of experienced strategists' cognitive representations. Normally,
when the goal is to study the relations between variables, one would choose a
purely descriptive design as long as variance in the proper variables is secured
(Churchill, 1979). Here, however, it was decided to use a contrasted groups
design. This is a research set-up belonging to what has become known as
'quasi experiments' (Nachmias, & Nachmias, 1981). As will be accounted for
below, this kind of design has some weaknesses associated with it when it
comes to inferring causal relationships (internal validity) but are otherwise well
suited for maximizing variance in the predictor variable.
Contrasted groups designs are characterized by the comparison of
groups that differ on the dimension under study, without random assignment of
individuals to the various groups. This implies a deviation from the classic
experiment pointing to some threats to internal validity>. Generally, the
problems may be tracked to the fact that the two groups will differ from one
another in other ways than what is controlled for through their selection. In the
present study, experienced managers were assigned to the experimental group
with the intention to measure associations between experience and the specified
cognitive characteristics. Students were assigned to the comparison group
because they lack this kind of experiences, Because the individuals may, and
5 'Internal validity' is here referred to in its extended, as well as traditional, sense
discussed earlier.
6 This is also the procedure which has gained precedence in this kind of research in
other fields (e.f. Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981).
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probably do, differ on other dimensions than that of experience with strategy
related decisions, the measured differences between the two groups may be
caused by these other influences. The classes of these alternate influences are,
however, identified, and some of them are not relevant for this particular study
while some others are controlled for to a certain extent. These subjects are
discussed more thoroughly later.
5.3. SAMPLE
As already indicated, the study is an analysis of the responses of two
contrasting groups of individuals. The selection of those individuals, and their
subsequent assignment to one group or the other, was based upon several
criteria. The first of these is related to the construct 'experience'. The study's
main objective is to analyze relationships between strategic work experience
and cognitive representations. Therefore, it was necessary to secure variance
on the experience dimension. Since it was impossible to know the degree of
impact of various levels of experience upon the cognitive structures, it was
decided to polarize the experience dimension as much as possible. This
intention was pursued by selecting 10 managers with several years of
experience (table 5.3.1.) with strategic work", and 10 students with no such
experience as comparison group.
7 Those were top- and middle level managers from four large Norwegian banks.
The managers had all profit/loss responsibility and belonged to various functional
departments. About half the banks were commercial and the rest were savings banks. All
were situated in Bergen,Norway.
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Table.5.3.1.: Table of Sample's Demographics
l
DEMOGRAPHICS
GROUPS AGE 2Y.B. S.E.B. S.E.O.1. S.E.T. H.E. M.D.
MANAGERS
STUDENTS
43.50
31.00
13.05
0.2<P
7.40
0.00
3.80 11.20
0.00 0.00
3 10
9 O
N=20
l All numbers are means, except for M.D.
2 Y.B.= Years of experience in the banking business
S.E.B.= Years of experience with strategic tasks in the banking business
S.E.O.l.= Years of experience with strategic tasks in other businesses
S.E.T.= Yeears of experience with strategic tasks in total
H.E.= Years of education in addition to economics/business adm. at the Graduate level
M.D.= Participation inmanagement development programs (frequency where l=yes, O=no)
3 One student had worked about two years in a bank
This may seem a small number of subjects, and the power of statistical
comparisons is indeed decreased by this. On the other hand, there is
established a precedence for such small numbers due to the high cost of
transcribing and coding the protocols. Therefore, a group of 20 subjects is
consistent with similar research and is even on the higher side. Isenberg
(1986) had 15 subjects ofwhich 12was managers. Adelson (1981) had a total
of 10 subjects, Bouwman (1984) had eight subjects and Chase and Simon used
a total of three chess players. The managers were contacted through personal
networks, and all of those contacted agreed to participate. The student group
consisted of research assistants at the graduate level, at the Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration. All the students approached
agreed to participate.
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In this type of design, internal validity is especially dependent upon
_-----_.-
the samples' characteristics, because differences along dimensions other than
experience may, potentially, explain variations in the criterion variables. This
threat is impossible to eliminate entirely, but on the other hand it may be~------
allevi~!~_~th careful selection of the samples and cautious interpretation of the
data. Consequently, the two groups were matched on some of the most
obvious potentially confounding dimensions. One of the most important of
those is probably that of education. Different training background would
provide the individuals with dissimilar conceptual backgrounds, at the least.
Therefore, care was taken that the two groups were matched as much as
possible conseming level and type of education. From table 5.3.1. it is clear
that all the individuals except one have BA bacground. The students have,
however, more education since most of them were in a Ph.d. program. The
managers, on the other hand, had all, except for one individual, participated in
several management development programs and some of them had also higher
education. In sum, the two groups' educational background seem reasonably
similar. Sex is another potentially confounding variable, because men and
women obviously have different experiences. However, the two groups are
almost perfectly matched in this respect, as there were two women in the
student group and one in the managerial group. It may be argued that the
differences in age (table 5.3.1.) pose a threat to the study's internal validity,
because differences in the criterion variables may be due to general maturity and
not the practising of a particular discipline. This issue might be met by using a
contrasting group of the same age as the managers. This was not done because
of practical problems with recruiting the research subjects. It is also
questionable if the differences in age really do pose a threat. Time alone do not
generate change in cognition, except for those contingent upon biological
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developmentf (Piaget, 1952). What initiates change and learning are events
and acts in the course of this time. Spending time practising a given discipline,
therefore, seemsto be a necessary condition for developing a certain level of
mastery. Other potentially influencing variables can be imagined like socio-
economic background, being brought up in or presently living in a milieu
relevant for the study. As the subjects are not randomly assigned to the two
groups, and the variables discussed above are not controlled for, they are
acknowledged as potential threats to internal validity.
Since experience is impossible to emulate in the laboratory over a
reasonable span of time, longitudinal and contrasted groups designs are the
most central alternatives given the problem. The last type of design was chosen
for the present study, due to practical constraints. With this as point of
departure, care has been taken to preserve internal validity, as the concept is
used here, to a reasonable degree.
Other types of validity must also be addressed in relation to the design
and sampling procedure. The two most important of those, which are related to
non-random assignment of individuals to study groups, are probably statistical
conclusion- and external validity. The problem associated with statistical
'--"«"~-'--~'---'--- I"'~'------
conclusion validity is, generally, violation of the assumptions of the statistical
techniques used. This is treated in the discussion of the results. The problem
with external validity is related to the fact that one cannot attach estimates of
standard errors to the sample results. Thus, it is problematic to infer population
characteristics, and relationships, from those of the sample. Again it must be
8 Hardly a relevant issue here, since the groups do not differ that much in age,
biologically seen.
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emphasized, however, that the present study is primarily concerned with
theory-testing. Therefore, external validity is not the central concern (Calder,
Phillips, & Tybout, 1982).
5.4. DATA-COLLECfIONPROCEDURE
The subjects were presented with four 'projective' minieases (discussed later)
and taped while analyzing those cases, according to the following procedure:
The interviews were conducted one at the time, by myself, at the subjects'
convenience. All subjects were told that they would be presented with four
minicases. They were instructed to analyze them, and suggest actions to
engage in given the situations they perceived in the cases. They were also told
that the cases contained little specific information, and that they were expected
to supply whatever data they felt the cases missed and felt appropriate for
explaining the cases. They were instructed to think aloud while working on the
cases, which proved to present no difficulties. They were also encouraged to
specify information which they would look for or want to have in order to
respond properly. The cases were then presented them one at a time on a
separate piece of paper. All respondents had the cases presented to them in
exactly the same order.
In the course of this process, some questions typically arised with
respect to the procedure, and sometimes relative to the interpretation of words
or phrases. Since I myself administered all the sessions, it was easy to respond
in a standard way to all such requests. All sessions were taped.
Chapter 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATACOLLECTION
66
5.5. VERBAL PROTOCOLS
The subjects were tape recorded while thinking aloud as they analyzed and
solved the four 'projective' mini-cases developed for this study. The tape
recordings were then transcribed and typed. Lastly, the written protocols
were studied and coded according to a coding scheme (Appendix 1). The
categories were based upon the theories discussed earlier; the constructs and
relationships between those constructs depicted in the conceptual model that
was used to generate the hypotheses. In order to keep the leap of inference
between the text and the theoretical categories as short as possible, sentences
were chosen as units of analysis (Weber, 1985). These are blocks of
information that are held to correspond directly to what is held in STM in 'real
time' (Ericsson, & Simon, 1980;Ericsson, & Simon, 1984). Therefore, there
is no inference from the text to the subjects' representations of the cases; the
two things are identical.
The think-aloud method, called verbal protocol analysis, has been
used frequently to study cognitive phenomena in general (Ericsson, & Simon,
1984). The method has also been used by researchers in management-related
fields (Bouwman, 1982; Bouwman, 1984; Isenberg, 1986; Schweiger,
Anderson, & Locke, 1985). Along with interest in the the method, discussions
over its merit have appeared (Ericsson, & Simon, 1980; Ericsson, & Simon,
1984; Payne, Braunstein, & Carrol, 1978; Ungson, Braunstein, & Hall,
1981). The issues discussed include the accuracy and completeness of
subjects' verbal reports (Nisbett, & DeCamp Wilson, 1977) as well as the
obtrusiveness of the thinking-aloud process (Schweiger, 1983). So far, the
verdict seem to be generally in favor of the method (Ericsson,& Simon, 1984).
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The use of verbal protocols may be evaluated with respect to reliability
and validity. The discussion on verbal protocols' reliability is confounded by
the various data sources referred to as verbal protocols. One major group is
reports of internal states and processes which presuppose that the subjects have
complete knowledge of their own mental processes, demonstrated without
doubt not to be the case (Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977). One other kind of verbal
protocols treats the verbalizations, as well as the knowledge and processes
necessary to produce them, as data. Following this procedure, one is not
forced to trust the subjects' interpretations and knowledge levels concerning
their mental operations (Ericsson, & Simon, 1980).
Foremost of the last group of verbal reports, being the closest
reflection of the cognitive process, is the concurrent verbal reports used in this
study. In a comprehensive summary of the literature, Ericsson and Simon (op.
cit.) argued, based upon generally accepted models of human information
processing, that this type of verbal protocols is usually accurate and
representative measures of cognitive processes. This is especially so, they
argued, when subjects are reporting memory traces that are already in verbal
form before they begin the process of verbalizing about them. This condition is
presumably met in this study, because the subjects verbalized while reading and
analyzing a written business case.
On the other hand, all data processing, also the analysis of verbal
protocols, involves interpretation. The interesting question then is if, how and
to what extent such data differs relative to other kinds of data: It has been
suggested that raw data, in general, goes through a sequence of steps from the
initial observation to the coded form used in the theoretical analysis (Coombs,
1964). In this process theory enters even in the first step of delimiting a
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portion of the available universe of potentially observable behavior as relevant.
At the next step, these behaviors are coded according to categories dictated by
theory. Concerning verbal behavior, all auditory data are contained in tape
recordings. Theory enters this stage in the parsing and segmenting of this
material when transcribing it. In deciding what constitutes units of
verbalizations, the coders apply grammatical, linguistic and other rules that may
help bracketing the stream of sounds making up a verbal protocol. As one is
here relying on culturally shared rules, there should be small variations between
coders, and coders and subjects, at this stage.
In the next phase, the units are encoded into the categories delineated
by the theoretical model which is the basis for the particular study. Human
judges, or computers, make the coding assessments based upon a coding
scheme decided upon earlier. The utility of the categories decided upon is a
function of the model selected for study. What may be of more immediate
concern is the reliability of the decisions which segments are assigned to what
category. Three types of reliability seems to be of special importance for
content analysis in this context; stability, reproducibility, and accuracy
(Krippendorff, 1980). Stability refers to the invariability of the results of
content analysis over time. This kind of reliability can be ascertained by having
the material coded at different time interval by the same coder. Because only
one person does the coding, this is the weakest form of reliability.
Reproducibility is also known as intercoder reliability. When the results are
stable across different coders, reproducibility is high. This kind of reliability is
held to be a minimum standard for content analysis (Weber, 1985). Accuracy
is the strongest form of reliability, and refers to the degree to which the
classification of text correspond to a standard or norm. The problem with this
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is that such standards very seldom exist. Consequently, this measure of
reliability is not often used by researchers.
In this study, reproducibility is proposed as a measure of reliability
since stability is too weak a measure and there is no standard to relate to in
order to assess accuracy. Intercoder reliability is also generally accepted as an
adequate measure of reliability in the behavioral and social sciences. In sum,
then, the data of verbal protocols are available for the same kind of verification
as those collected by other kinds of observation.
The question of validity is more complex, as in most other kinds of
empirical research. Validity, in protocol analysis, is probably most critical in
the relationship between the categories decided upon and their empirical
counterparts in the form of for instance words, sentences and paragraphs. This
is essentially the question of semantic validity (Krippendorff, 1980), which
exists when persons familiar with the texts examine lists of units placed in the
same category and agree that these units have the same meanings. The analysis
of verbal protocols are open to misinterpretations because of a range of
ambiguities inherent in language. For example, should the sentence "I was so
sure about it!" be categorized as reference to an earlier experience or the
subject's remark to his/her own behavior in the research situation? Semantic
validity may be measured formally by having expert judges categorize units on
the basis of their semantic similarities, and comparing their output with the
categorized units based upon the analytic procedure by other persons
(Krippendorff, 1980). In the present study, semantic validity was controlled
for less formally through consultation with several persons with expertise in the
field of strategy when developing the categories. Although this is a less
desirable procedure, it is frequently used and demands less resources, which
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was a pertinent requirement for this study. In addition, the categories were
defined conceptually very close to the actual text, in order to minimize the
amount of inference needed. If the protocols are valid data with respect to the
subjects' strategic images, would other kinds of measurement covary with the
data obtained from the protocols? This is basically the question of construct
validity, which is dealt with in the next chapter.
5.6. CASES
We wanted to study top managers with strategic experience. It would be very
hard to have such individuals commit themselves to the time and inconvenience
involved in a laboratory setting. Therefore, strategic stimuli were presented to
them in the form of four business cases in written form, a procedure which has
gained precedence in the literature (Dearborn, & Simon, 1958; Isenberg,
1986).
The cases were developed for this particular study. Since the objective
was to study the subjects' cognitive representations several requirements had to
be met. First, the extent of the subjects' contextual knowledge was expected to
vary. Therefore, the cases just sketch strategic situations in the managers'
fields. This is one way to make respondents provide elements from their own
knowledge-base and its structure, which was one object of the study. The
rationale behind this procedure is well developed in literature on projective tests
in clinical and experimental psychology (cf Kleinmuntz, 1967). Second, we
wanted cases that stimulated large productions of verbal protocols in order to
sample as much as possible of their representations. Therefore, four minicases
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(instead of one as is usual) of varying degrees of specificity and
'structuredness' were developed and tested before use. The design of the cases
was done by myself and a professor in the field of Market Economy. The
cases' themes were selected from the banking industry, and incorporated
current events covered by the Norwegian press at the time, as well as elements
basic to strategic management as a theoretical field. The idea behind this was
simply to secure some degree of representativeness of the field both in in its
theoretical and practial aspects. In addition to concern about the cases'
contents, they were designed on the basis of a particular categorisation of
strategic stimuli. It has been argued that strategic stimuli, or strategic signals,
vary in strength (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). Strength refers
here to the demand for immediate' action implied by the stimuli. If, for
example, the entire work force goes on strike, something usually has to be
done within a short span of time. Work on problem solving and -formulation
has indicated that it is of val ue to think of stimuli situations as more or less
structured (Kaufmann, 1987b). In a structured problem situation, the goal and
the means to reach the goal are known. In an unstructured situation those
elements have to be established by the actor. Strategic stimuli may be
categorized according to this dimension also. A trend in social values
developing over years is one example of stimuli that one assume will represent
some kind of issue, but when and how and with what implications are unclear.
The dimensions of strength and structuredness form a matrix which was the
basis for developing the cases (fig. 5.6.).
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Fig. 5.6.: Categories of Strategic Stimuli
The matrix offers four categories of strategic stimuli: 1) Pressing,
which are strong and clear signals that have to be acted upon without delay; 2)
Hidden stimuli which are easy to interprete but that have to be uncovered; 3)
Ambiguous stimuli which present themselves but must be interpreted through
diagnosis; and 4) Potential stimuli that only exist as a possibility. These
typically call for innovative behavior (Haukedal, 1989).
Each of the four cases were designed with reference to one of the cells
in the above matrix, as an attempt to secure variation in the subjects' responses.
The first case (Appendix 3) was designed to capture stimuli of the 'pressing'
kind; the loss of market shares. This is a rather straight-forward situation not
very demanding on the interpretation-side. The second case was written with
the fourth cell, that of potential strategic stimuli, as reference. Here, the
subjects had to generate the issue themselves completely, as this 'case' was just
a request for a strategic plan. Interestingly, several of the managers
spontaneously draw a parallel between this case and their own work. The third
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case was rather clear in its implications, because first-buyers' home loans
(Appendix 3) are not profitable for banks. On the other hand, this strategic
stimulus was not strong because the case did not force one to give this kind of
loans, and it was not specified how to give priority to the applicants.
Therefore, this is an example of 'hidden' strategic stimuli; relatively clear in its
implications but with no immediate demand for action. The fourth case was
built on the third cell, which is that of 'ambiguous' stimuli. This is a case
demanding that something be done, as it refers to an official regulation. It is,
however, a completely new situation where the implications are not known.
Therefore, it calls for diagnosis in order to adjust to the authorities' intentions
and at the same time securing one's interests.
There is a subjective element in the two dimensions which these
categories are built upon: For example, very explorative individuals confront
more data than those less explorative. Therefore, what are strong stimuli for
one individual may be weak to an other. This variable has been demonstrated
to be related to innovativeness in problem solving (Kaufmann, 1987a) and
creativity in art (Getzels, & Csikzentmihalyi, 1965; Getzels, &
Csikzentmihalyi, 1975). Likewise, what is perceived as 'structured' is
probably a function of both the stimulus and the subjects' level of knowledge
relative to the stimulus' context. This is just another way to say that there will
be variation in the ways that the various cases are perceived and responded to
because individuals are different. And some of these differences are due to
experience in the field of practise referred to in the cases.
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CHAPTER 6
Variables: Their Reliability and Validity
In this chapter the variables' operationalizations are presented, along with the
results of the testing of their reliability and validity. As noted earlier, the
intercoder reliability is chosen as measure ofreliability. Concerning validity,
the discussion focuses upon the construct type.
6.1. OPERA TIONALIZA TION OF VARIABLES
In order to test the hypotheses empirically, the variables have to be
operationalized. The conceptual model, and the hypotheses drawn from its
relationships and specifications, are theoretical entities. By defining their
observable aspects, through the operationalizing process, they are made
accessible for empirical investigation (for a list of the names of the variables,
please refer to table 6.3).
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6.1.1. Experience
As indicated earlier, the concept of 'expertise' is difficult to operationalize
because the very classification itself may be more theoretical than real in a
substantive sense. On the other hand, it has been established without doubt
that in a range of fields encompassing medicine, mathematics and physics,
extensive practise gives the subject better problem representations. In chess,
researchers have relied on the established classification of players as criteria for
who are experts and who are not (Chase, & Simon, 1973a; Chase, & Simon,
1973b). When it comes to fields like physics and medicine it becomes more
difficult. The general procedure has developed to accept practitioners and
instructors with considerable experience as experts (Adelson, 1981; Bouwman,
1982; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser; Lesgold, Feltovich, Glaser, &Wang; Weaver,
& Carrol, 1984). This was also the procedure chosen here. The managers
included in the study had all extensive experience with all aspects of strategic
work in the banking industry. In this respect they are assumed to be more
adept at responding to strategic stimuli than novices. It is also assumed that
such performance was based on attributes of their environmental
representations (EI). This variation is analyzed in the present study, therefore
the issue of expertise or not is of rhetoric more than substantive interest in the
present context.
Experience, then, is defined as the period of time working with
strategic matters on a day-to-day basis and in the environment of the banking
industry. The group of managers (EXPERTOR=1) has more experience (table
5.3.1.) and is therefore positively correlated with this variable, while the
student group (EXPERTOR=O) were chosen on the criterion not to have this
kind of experience. Thus, the variance on this variable is secured.
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6.1.2. Environmental Images
EI is defined as the portion of LTM most relevant for strategy related problems,
and it is known through a subjects' verbalizations. This raises a couple of
issues which must be dealt with. First, the representations were argued to be
partly of non-verbal character-that is the episodic and some aspects of the
procedural representations. Episodic representations are nonverbal memory
traces of personall experiences. It may then be argued that these
representations can not be communicated verbally, because this amounts to
semantic processing of the material. Verbal communications of episodic
memory are therefore nothing else than the communication of semantic
representations. This objection maybe countered by several arguments. First,
episodic representations are probably not possible to communicate at all as
such; how could one make one's personal experiences, with all the feelings,
moods and perceptual qualities generally, objective and available for others?
The essential point here, however, is that we are not really interested in these
experiences in themselves. What is of interest here is their significance for
semantic processing, which is exactly what one gets. The verbalizations are the
end-result of episodic material (when this is accessed) 'brought into' the
semantic representational mode, processed there, fed into STM and
communicated verbally. This brings the second point to attention, which is that
the whole idea of episodic representations was offered in response to
irregularities in research on semantic memory (Tulving, 1972; Tulving, 1983).
A third argument is that we are not analyzing the characteristics of episodic
representations per se, which might be biased by the verbal expression and
recoding implied by that process. Instead, we are merely arguing for and
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investigating the existence and application of such representations in relation to
experience.
Another objection may be raised. If environmental images are known
through the subjects' verbalizations-what is then the difference between these
and other representations? To this it may be answered that the verbalizations
referred to are responses to strategic stimuli. Knowledge and cognitive
representations are not completely isolated 'things'. Rather, they are probably
better conceptualized as a more or less integrated whole, parts of which may be
more developed than others. According to stimuli, certain parts of this whole
are excited and become active. In the case of the strategic stimuli the parts
relevant to strategic problems/themes are activated, and these are what is
referred to as 'environmental images'. In other words, EIs are the parts of
LTM activated by strategic stimuli
6.1.3. Episodic representation.
As noted earlier, the measurement of episodic representations introduces some
problems of its own. As far as I know, there is no standard procedure
concerning the operationalization of this kind of representations. Nevertheless,
given their nature as discussed earlier, it seems possible to detect the use of
such representations through noting subjects' referrals to personal experiences
and the use of analogies.
Concerning personal experiences, two conditions must be satisfied in
order to qualify as referrals to episodic representations. First, the subject must
use a personal referrallike I, me, my, one and we. Second, the subject may
use such referrals in contexts other than episodic memory as when reflecting on
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how to proceed with solving the case. Therefore, the personal referral must be
expressed in relation to an experience. These two conditions together imply
that indications for episodic representations must be coded with larger units
than single words. Since reliability is increased by holding units of text small
(Weber, 1985), sentences are chosen as unit of analysis. In other words,
sentences containing personal and experiential referrals are suggested as
operationalizations of activated episodic representations (PERSEX).
The use of analogies may also be taken as indications of episodic
activation. This is because subjects may use referrals to events as illustrations
of their message, without semantical elaborations. By labelling such events,
they trust the other party to have ac~ess to similar material in their memory,
which they can draw upon in order to understand. Therefore, sentences
containing analogous referrals (ANALOG) are also serving as
operationalizations of episodic processing. These are verbalizations containing
references to other events or phenomena in order to elaborate on or exemplify a
theme connected with the work on the cases.
In sum then, two variables are taken as empirical evidence for the
activation of episodic memory: Personal experience (PERSEX) and analog
reasoning (ANALOG).
6.1.4. Procedural Representations
As pointed out earlier, EI consists of three representational modes. One of
them is the procedural. This mode is operationalized as statements about
actions referred to by the subject with respect to the cases (ACf ION). There is
a problem here because in some cases there may be ambiguity as to deciding if
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the subject really is referring to some action, even though he/she certainly uses
a verb. For example: "Then you would have to find out if-if it is caused by
one business area or the other". On the one hand, 'find out' is a verb, and
implies some sort of action or procedure. On the other hand, it is vague,
general and tied to manners of speach, and do not communicate any obvious
signal as to how the intention might be carried out. Therefore, this type of
procedures was left out of the analysis. This left actions that was clearly
labelled: "First, you would have to do a market analysis", or had a specific
target in view: "I would engage in some lobbying through the Association of
Saving Banks, with respect to the authorities". As before, sentences are
chosen as units of analysis.
6.1.5. Contextual knowledge.
This refers to knowledge about a range of dimensions including material,
economical, and social elements specific to the banking industry. Single words
may be generally known but still have meaning-contents specific for this
particular field. Therefore, sentences are again chosen as units of analysis.
Specifically, the concern will be with 1) strategic issues (SPESTRA), or things
associated with strategy, specific for the banking industry (for instance
constraints specific for this particuar industry's environment), and 2)
economical topics (SPESECON) specific for the banking industry (for example
concern with operating capital).
There is one problem here because of the pervasive nature of the field
of banking relative to the rest of the business field. All kinds of firms,
businesses and organizations with some kind of economic concerns come into
touch with a range of banking concepts. It was therefore decided that the
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concepts did not have to belong to the banking industry exclusively in order to
be coded in this category. They should rather be specific in the sense that they
should refer to elements of the banking business even though relevant to other
businesses as well. Risk capital, for example, is a term referring to a product
in the banking business environment, but at the same time relevant for most
firms of other businesses as well because of the almost universal nature of
economy related concerns.
6.1.6. Context free strategy related statements
In contrast to contextual knowledge, context free statements are verbalizations
that do not necessarily imply knowledge of the banking industry or its activities
in other industries. Statements of general administrative/strategic principles,
which may be applied to any organization existing in a changing environment,
are operationalizations of this variable.
Two variables are taken as indicators of this kind and level of
knowledge: 1) Strategic statements which are generic (GENSTRA) to the field
of business strategy (for example: "This may be a potential entrant to the
market"). 2) Economic matters generic to all industries (GENEC) where such
concerns are relevant. These are mostly micro- and macro-economical matters
like concerns about revenue and economical fluctuations in society (for detailed
exposition of the operationalization of the specific variables the reader is
referred to Appendix. 1).
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6.1.7. Referrals to Theories and Models
These are references to theories, models and authors generally known from the
field of business strategy or strategic management (THEORY).
6.2. THECODING PROCEDURE
The statements of the protocols were categorized according to the rules
formalized in the Codebook (App. 1). These rules were designed for the
present study, as there are no standard procedures to apply. One important
issue must be dealt with in this context. This is related to the choice between
coding a given statement as belonging to one category only, or permitting it to
be coded as belonging to several categories. The issue is an important one that
has not been resolved in the centralliterature. The only advice given is that the
researcher must choose one or the other, and be attentive to the consequences
of the chosen procedure (see for example Weber, 1985).
Coding statements into several categories, if applicable, is an attractive
alternative. Some statements naturally may be understood according to several
semantic dimensions. Forcing a choice of only one category for such
statements is an artificial constraint and make it harder for coders to agree. In
other words, allowing for several categories for coding single statements makes
sense from a semantical point of view and enhances intercoder agreement. On
the other hand, such a procedure makes it hard to do multivariate statistical
analyses on the data-material, because of the chances it entails for spurious
relationships between the variables due to language patterns. Of course, one
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statement could be seen as an item with several attributes given by the profile of
categories it was classified into. Such a procedure would, however, not match
the demands of this study. In addition, the data material is probably too small
to allow for statistical processing if this procedure was followed.
In consequence of the views discussed above, it was decided that one
statement should be coded into one category only. When no category matched,
the statement was not to be coded. If it was impossible to decide upon one
category to code the statement into, it was to be left out. Otherwise, the coding
was to proceed according to the structure of the codebook in such a way that if
a statement was coded as for example ANALOG, it was not available for the
other categories. In practise, however, some corrections did occur when a later
category was felt to be a better match than the one already chosen.
6.3. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONALISATIONS
The operationalisations above result in nine variables. When analyzing the
relationships between those variables, group membership (EXPERTOR) will
serve as the independent, or predictor, variable. The other eight are analyzed
relative to that variable single or in groups, according to their classification
(Fig. 6.3.). As inspection of the figure reveals,
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PERSEX
ANALOO
Group belonging: l=managerial group
2=student group
Referrals to personal experiences
EXPERTOR
Analog reasoning
ACTION
SPESEC
SPESTRA
THEORY
Referrals to procedures
Referrals to contextual economic matters
Referrals to contextual strategy related matters
Referrals to specific theories or models in the
strategy related literature
GENEC
GENSTRA
Referrals to general economic concerns
Referrals to general strategy related matters
Table 6.3.: Variable Names and Their Meaning
the episodic representational mode is reflected by two variables (ANALOG,
PERSEX). The semantic mode is reflected by five variables (SPESEC,
SPESTRA, GENEC, GENSTRA, TIffiORY) at three levels of contextual
specificity. The procedural mode is reflected in one variable (ACTION).
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EPISODIC [
ANALa]
-----I PERSEX
SEMANTIC
-cSPESECCONfEX1lJAL SPESTRA
-[
GENEC
CONTEXr -FREE
GENSTRA
PROCEDURAL ACTION
Fig.6.3.: Map of the Variables' Conceptual Structure
The scheme above depicting the variables' structure relative to each
other must be interpreted as a conceptual heuristic. It is not intended to reflect
an empirical reality. In other words, the concepts for the various levels of the
semantic mode must be understood as classificatory, and not as underlying
constructs.
~----
In this chapter, the variables' intercoder reliability are reported. The data was
obtained through the following procedure. First, a coding manual (Appendix
1) was developed and used by the author to code the complete set of protocols.
Then, another person used the same manual to code approximately 20% of the
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material'', Only the author coded the whole set of categories. Reliability was
then calculated based on sentence-to-sentence matches between the coders, on
each category. One coder has business administration training, where
organizational theory and business strategy are parts of the curriculum. The
other coder has a degree in Organizational Sciences.
The intercoder reliability was calculated using the coefficient kappa
(Cohen, 1960). This is a technique for assessing agreement between several
coders relative to what is expected by chance variation. Thus, it is more
attractive than simply counting up the proportion of cases in which the judges
agreed (Krippendorff, 1980). The coefficient kappa (K) is the "proportion of
chance-expected disagreements which do not ,occur, or alternatively, it is the
proportion of agreement after chance agreement is removed from consideration"
(Cohen, op. cit., p.40). When adjusting for free marginals (Brennan, &
Prediger, 1981), the formula is:
J -~K __ o_~
- N-~ where
K = kappa coefficient
J = observed frequency of agreed upon matches
o
N = total no. of observations
n = no. of categories
9 This was a uniform random sample of 30 numbers. out of 149. being pages of
transcribed verbal protocols. The sample was generated by the Minitab uniform sample
generator.
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The Kappa (K) may not be higher than 1.0, which is total agreement
between the coders. Its level of statistical significance is found by transforming
it to its corresponding z-score, which may then be located on a regular normal
distribution.
6.4.1. Results of Testing for Intersubjective Reliability
By the procedure discussed above, the following data were obtained for the
variables (Table 6.4.1.). Inspection of the table reveal that all the variables
attain high intercoder agreement, reaching a high level of statistical significance.
Table 6.4.1. Results of Testing for Intercoder Agreement
STATISTICS
VARIABLES
ANALOG 94.32 0.89*** 0.81<->0.97
PERSEX 99.61 0.99*** 0.96<-> 1.02
SPESEC 96.38 0.93*** 0.88<->0.98
SPESTRA 82.69 0.65*** 0.58<->0.74
GENEC 96.08 0.92*** 0.87<->0.97
GENSTRA 83.73 0.67*** 0.59<->0.75
THEORY 100.00 1.00***
ACTION 92.83 0.86*** 0.80<->0.92
N=20
1Percent agreed codings
2 Kappa coefficient
3 Confidence interval
*** Indicate P<.OOl
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Still, some issues must be dealt with, that may have served to inflate
the results to some degree. The first of these have to do with the persons doing
the coding. I myself was one of the two persons. Since I also had formed the
categories in the first place, knew the hypotheses and had trained the other
coder, it is possible that the agreement between us was greater than it would
have been between two equally 'naive' coders, due to less random errors in the
present case. The second issue concerns the training of the other coder. In
addition to studying the Codebook; the rules and examples there, the other
coder was given feed-back for the first two (of 30) pages for every variable by
me. In the actual case there was seldom need for any communication. Still,
6.7% of the sampled protocols could, in principle, be said to be coded in
cooperation. Ideally, this training should have been done on material not
included in the analysis. The reason for not following this precaution was the
small size of the data-set to begin with. In sum, there is reason to suspect that
the results of the reliability test is somewhat inflated. On the other hand, the
margin is probably large enough to assimilate this error. Therefore, it is
concluded that the variables satisfy the demand of intereoder reliability.
(/
\. 6.5. VALIDITY OF THE VARIABLES
\
\
As pointed out earlier, semantic validity is a central concept for this kind of
study and is to a certain extent taken care of. In a more general sense, internal-,
statistical conclusion- and construct validity must also be considered. Internal
validity has already been discussed and statistical validity is addressed together
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with the discussion of the statistical method used. This leaves construct
-- - ._--_ ....._.-.__ ,_
validity unaccounted for.
Following Cook and Campell (1979:59), construct validity is seen as
the degree to which operations, or empirical measures, represent a particular
theoretical construct. This type of validity is generally assessed through
measuring the covariance between different measures of the same construct,
and the presumed lack of covariance between measures of different constructs
(Cook, & Campell, 1979). The most elegant example of this procedure is the
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix Method (MMMM) (Campbell, & Fiske, 1959;
Reve, 1985). This technique takes a correlation-matrix as its point of
departure, and calculates discriminability and convergence of the measures.
Other techniques are also based upon correlation-matrixes, but test only
convergence through factor analysis (Kerlinger, 1973:468). These are
powerful techniques, but build upon some assumptions which are hard to
accomodate to in protocol analyses. One of those requirements is that there
must be several measurements of a particular construct. In survey studies or
when using psychological tests one is free to design as many measures as one
like of a particular construct, which may be used in a correlation matrix as
sketched above. This is not the case in the analysis of protocols where one
must take the verbal material as it is offered. If there are only single, or very
few, measurements of a given construct, it is hard and even impossible to
employ MMMM. In addition, the practise of seeking maximum covariance
between measures of the same construct is criticised on the ground that when
the correlations are very large, it simply means that they measure overlapping
dimensions of the construct, which is diametrically opposed to the reason why
several measures are used in the first place (Kidder, 1981; Wilcox, 1989).
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At the current stage of the method of protocol analysis there is a real
problem with measuring validity. In published studies of experts, using
protocol analysis, the issue is simply not addressed. In the two seminal works
on protocol analysis as used in this study, validity is barely mentioned
(Ericsson, & Simon, 1984; Newell, & Simon, 1972). The reason for this lack
of concern is explained by reference to the knowledge of language for inferring
cognitive structures from verbal behavior: "- we rely upon a systematic, but
informal, set of procedures, combined with our own knowledge of the English
language and our consequent ability to extract meanings from natural-language
strlngs--to extract from the protocols the most directly obvious components of
the underlying deep structures that are implic~t in them." (Newell, & Simon,
1972: 185). In the present study we have, however, decided to go a step
further in the direction of validating the data. The essence of MMMM is to
compare different measures of the same constructs. Therefore, it is possible to
obtain some indication of the convergence validity (one dimension of construct
validity) by correlating each measure by itself across the four cases. The four
cases are then seen as different measures of the same theoretical constructs.
One objection may be raised here. It may be argued that the four cases are not
'different enough' to qualify as discriminant measures of the variables. The
optional situation would be to have another source of data altogether,
measuring the same variables. This could, for instance, be responses to tests
or behaviors in a real or simulated situation. In the absence of such data,
however, the chosen procedure represents a working compromise. It is also
frequently used when validating questionaires.
In this format, convergent validity is indicated when there is a positive
correlation between the four measures of a particular construct. Correlation
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matrices for all the measures are reproduced in App. 2, together with some
descriptive statistics. As inspection of that material reveals, most of these
measures are characterized by evenly distributed positive correlations,
indicating convergent validity. One problem here is that there is no standard for
how large the correlations should be in order to be interpreted as meaningful.
The level of statistical significance is reported for the various correlations, but
they are suspect since a certain number of significant relationships are to be
expected as a result of chance alone. It may be more interesting to study those
measures that do not yield to the pattern of positive correlations.
ANALOO confoms very much to the expected pattern, except for case
#4, which is negatively correlated wi~ the other cases. There is no clue to this
deviation in the statistics for this variable, except that it is quite skewed and the
correlations in question are, after all, quite small. On the other hand, the
consistent pattern seems to indicate that case #4 is somewhat different from the
others with respect to this variable. Still, there is enough positive relationship
across the other cases to conclude that the variable is convergently valid to a
reasonable degree. This conclusion holds for PERSEX and SPESEC also.
The next variable SPESTRA, on the other hand, also has one case deviating
from the pattern of positive correlations. This variable is hard to interpret along
the lines established here, because there are some large, some small and some
negative relationships between the various cases; no definite pattern emerges.
Therefore, the result for this variable is inconclusive. GENEC shares the
profile of small, and some negative, relationships. These results, however,
may be ascribed to great differences in means, variances and skewness between
the four cases. Again, the result is inconclusive with respect to convergent
validity. GENSTRA, on the other hand, is described by a consistent pattern of
posive correlations, matching nicely to the pattern prescribed for a convergently
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valid variable. The results for THEORY cannot be interpreted, because the
cases are very skewed, and the fourth case is missing; there was no statements
in this category for that case. For the last variable, ACTION, the results
support the conclusion of convergent validity, although case #3 is deviant.
This leaves us with three variables for which the results are non-supportive or
inconclusive with regard to convergent validity: SPESTRA, GENEC and
TIIEORY. This fact must be taken into consideration when interpreting the
statistical analyses later.
In addition to quantifying this one element of construct validity it is
important to identify potential threats to the latter validity type in a more general
sense, in order to evaluate the data on a broader base. A list of such threats is
offered by Cook and Campbell (1979:64). Here I will confine myself to
discuss those which seems to be the least guarded against in the present data-
material. One of these is the tendency to hypothesis-guessing within the
experiment by the subjects. Very little is known about the particulars of this
phenomenon; under what conditions it is most likely to occur, whether it is
treatment specific etc. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the degree to
which the results are confounded by such influences. The fact that the research
hypotheses are relatively distant from everyday concerns may be taken as an
obstacle to such behavior on behalf of the subjects. Evaluation apprehension is
another threat grounded in individuals' motivations to present themselves as
favorably as possible to the experimenter. The seriousness of this threat is
eased by the fact that it probably is a general trait shared by most of the subjects
making up the samples. Moreover, the desire to present oneself as competent
is not a serious interference relative to the hypotheses of this study.
Experimenter expectancy is a more serious threat which is present because I
administered the interviews myself. As pointed out earlier, standardization of
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the procedure was one measure to limit this problem. Another was to have an
assistant unfamiliar with the hypotheses code a sample of the responses. Still,
this is threat which must be addressed when considering the results.
In sum, construct validity is accounted for to certain degree even if
some threats have to be acknowledged. This applies especially to three
measures discussed above. In relation to the precedence established by
published works in this field the quantification of convergent validity represents
an improvement at the operationallevel.
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PART IV
Empirical Analysis

CHAPTER 7
Statistical Procedure and Description of
Data-set
7.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the hypotheses presented earlier are tested empirically. The
analyses focus upon differences between the two groups relative to the
variables discussed earlier. These differences are tested with MANOVA
(Multivariate Analysis of Variance) lO.
First, the data-material is presented along with a discussion of its
general characteristics. Then, the results are discussed relative to each of the
single hypotheses. When reporting the results of the hypothesis tests, their
main features are fust presented. Then, the actual data are reproduced in tables.
At the conclusion, the results are discussed in relation to the hypothesis in
question.
10 The analyses are made with the Systat (v. 5.0) statistical package on an Apple
Macintosh personal computer.
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7.2. TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS
The reasons for choosing the abovementioned statistical techniques are quite
straight-forward. All the hypotheses are about group differences. In most of
the hypotheses, the differences between the groups are tested on constructs
reflected in several variables. When there is one categorical predictor variable
(EXPERTOR = experienced or inexeperienced subject) and several dependent
criterion variables, then MANOVA is a suitable method (Bray, & Maxwell,
1985). There is one other reason why MANOVA is the preferred method
here. Most hypotheses tested involve the use of several dependent criterion
variables which probably intercorrelate to a certain extent. For example, the
variables SPESTRA (domain specific strategic concerns) and SPESEC (domain
specific economy concerns) reflect the same level of knowledge abstraction.
Therefore it is natural to suspect these two variables to intercorrelate to a
degree. Inspection of table 7.2. confirms that the variables are indeed
intercorrelated to a certain extent. The MANOV A test considers this
intercorrelation by looking at the multiple-dimensional space of the criterion
variables simultaneously, and this is one of its advantage over single ANOV A
tests. Due to this characteristic, it may help reduce the risk of both Type I and
Type II errors relative to ANOV All. In addition, MANOV A lets one
11The latter technique only evaluate relationships between the predictor variable
and one criterion variable at the time. Because intercorrelations between the criterion
variables is not considered in ANOYA, valuable information may be lost relative 10 the
hypotheses that is being tested. Consequently, the conclusion reached with respect to the
acceptance or rejection of the null-hypothesis have a greater chance of being false.
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investigate the relationship between the criterion variables so one may learn
more about the data set as a totality.
Chapter 7: STATISTICAL PROCEDURE AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA-SET
z 8o q
6-<
8 0\>- 0\~ q -:o ....
~
E-<
-< ** *~ 8 ..,. t"-~ ....en q ~ V'JZ ....
'-Llo
u 8 8 C"I .... ~C"I o
~ q C'! C'! q
cCl).... I I E'-Llo £
* S* <Il-< § * * ~~
..,. 0\ e--~ o 0\
~
....
<t: E-< ~ ~ -:en I u>o '-Ll ogc,
9
~
en
'O~ * <Il* CoS U * °eo 8 I/") 00 C"I ~"O '-Ll ~ 00 00 C"I 0\Cl) en -: ~ -: C'! -:
~
(I)
'-Ll I I I.... ....c, 1/")0en o .
c .... ·0o .0 vov~
>< * ) ~~CI)* *'-Ll $ \O .... o I/") r- oo CI)~-5en I/") '00 -: \O 00 ~~ -: ~ V'J C'! ~ ~ -5«!«!'-Ll .... I I I - -o... .§ (II-B
u §BS* !.= ss* * .... S. c
~
* * § ceo$ ~ .... o C"I I/") ~ ~ So·~·;!t"- o t"- oo ~~ ~ ~ -: V'J -: ~ c .r;; <Il.ra.... I I I .g <Il.ra c
S ....8 oc ·i
* * * * 8 0·.::1~ ..::1 (11-- * * * * * * (11_ Cl)8 ..,. ~ ..,. 0\ 0\ ~ g: \O u Q3~5E-< I/") I/") 00 ~ 0\ .... C~ q ~ V'J ~ V'J ~ V'J ~ ~ j t: 8 uæ I I I o Cl)UCl)-5><: ~-5_
E-< '-Ll ~ «!.g~~
~ <:
~
<Il -5~£8 ><:
~
... ~ (Ilu
~ u s .8 ~ U.U ~~ l.t:I l.t:Iæ
~
en en ri) ffi ffi
~
§ Il :a:g..sø::: l.t:I ~ ~ z z..s::><: ~ o...l.t:I ri) ri) o o .... C"I * * *
101
As in ANOVA, the interpretation of MANOV A proceeds in two steps.
First one tests the overall hypothesis of no differences in the means for the
different groups. Second, if the result of the omnibus test is significant, one
conducts follow-up tests to explain the group differences. There is no
procedure which has gained concensual support in the literature in any of these
two steps. Therefore one have to choose these for oneself, necessitating some
argument for the ones selected. Severalomnibus MANOVA tests, comparable
to the overall F test in ANOV A, have been developed. They have all in
common the principle that they test the null hypothesis that for each variable all
groups have the same population mean (Bray, & Maxwell, 1985). The
alternative hypothesis is that for at le~st one variable there is at least one group
with a population mean that is different from the others. In other words, just
one inequality in the population is enough to make the null hypothesis false.
Four different types of omnibus MANOV A tests have been offered. Here, the
Pillai-Bartlett trace is reported because it is found to be the most robust (Olson,
1974; Olson, 1976). However, a statistically significant test is not necessarily
an important one. And conversely, with small samples, as in the present case,
meaningful sample differences may go undetected because of reduced statistical
power. The average of the canonical correlations 61~ull)has been proposed as
a measure of the strength of association between the groups and the set of
criterion variables (Cramer, & Nicewander, 1979). The number of canonical
correlations is the lesser of number of groups minus one and number of
criterion variables (Bray & Maxwell, 1985:36). Therefore, there will only be
one canonical correlation in this study. By squaring this measure, then, one
has an indication with respect to the variance in the dependent criterion
variables which is determined by group membership.
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When the overall significance has been determined, the next problem
is how to interpret this result. Several alternatives have been suggested. One
may follow a significant MANDY A with ANOYAs on each of the criterion
variables. Each univariate F ratio that reaches the specified alpha level is
considered statistically significant and available for interpretation. The most
important problem with this method seems to be the risk it entails for not
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact false (Bray, 1985). Where this
risk is of lesser concern, univariate F tests is a viable method. In addition this
method, when used in combination with other methods like Canonical
Correlation Analysisl-, can give information concerning the contribution of
individual variables. The canonical variate correlations involves calculating the
correlation of each individual variable with each, in this case one, canonical
factor. These are analogous to factor loadings, and represent how much
variance a particular variable shares with the underlying composite (Bray, &
Weber, 1985).
7.3. ASSUMPTIONSOFMANDY A ANDSTATISTICALPOWER
All inferential statistical techniques are based on a set of assumptions. So also
MANOYA. These are: 1) The research units are randomly sampled from the
target population, 2) Observations are statistically independent of each other, 3)
The dependent variables have a multivariate normal distribution within each
12 MANOVAmay be seen as one of several particular instances of Canonical
Correlation Analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Grablowsky, 1979.
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group, 4) The groups (the categorical predictor variable) have a common
within-group population covariance matrix (Bray, 1985). Assumption 1) is not
a serious threat for this study, since external validity is not given priority. The
second assumption is probably satisfied. MANOV A is known to be robust
concerning violations of assumption 3), other than the risk of reduced statistical
power (Bray, 1985). The last assumption is met by employing the optimal
omnibus test (0Is09, 1979). When the sample sizes are equal, the Pillai-
Bartlett trace seems to be the most robust relative to violations of this particular
assumption (Bray, 1985).
Some observations of a general character have been pointed out
concerning the statistical power of MANOVA (Stevens, 1980: 1) power is
reduced by large numbers of dependent criterion variables, 2) small to moderate
group sizes reduce power and 3) power is affected by the magnitude of within-
group intercorrelations. These points have to be considered in relation to the
interpretation of the results later, not the least because the sample sizes of this
study is undoubtedly on the small side.
7.4. DESCRIPTION OF DATA SET
In this chapter the protocols and their characteristics, after being coded, are
presented. The means and standard deviations of statements, and no. of
subjects recorded are first reponed, relative to the four cases (Table 7A.l.).
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Table 7.4.1: Protocol Statistics According to Case
Case Statistics
Mean SD N
1 37.16 18.26 19
2 33.55 18.52 20
3 24.10 13.17 20
4 26.15 10.36 20
1 The statistics are for statements of the verbal protocols
As is evident from the table above, there are small differences in
verbal output between the various cases. The reason for the first two cases'
higher content of verbalizations is probably that the subjects were less tired in
the beginning of the session. This conjecture is supported by the fact that
variability in verbal output, as evidenced by the standard deviation, is redused
in the cases presented last. At this point all of the subjects presumably were
tired and some of the sources of variance may have been weakened because of
this. With respect to group differences, the managers have a higher verbal
output than the students, except for case 3 (Fig. 7.4.1.).
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Fig.7.4.1.: Frequency of Statements in Verbal Protocols
according to Case and Group Membership
The protocols contain 2382 statements in total. Of those, 1515
(63.60%) were coded according to the categories reported here. The managers'
protocols contained 1262 statements in total, and 921(72.97%) were coded.
The students' protocols contained a total of 1120 statements, of which 594
(53.03%) were coded. In other words, 20 percent more of the manager
group's protocols were included in the analysis. With respect to those
numbers, it must be pointed out that the categories are not designed to be
exhaustive with respect to the total material contained in the protocols.
The statements that were coded divided themselves unequally among
the categories (Table 7.4.2.).
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Table 7.4.2.: Means of Variables l
Variables Statistics
Mean SD N
ANALOO 2.50 4.41 20
PERS EX 4.50 7.79 20
SPES EC 5.45 8.14 20
SPESTRA 42.10 28.66 20
GENEC 6.70 7.10 20
GENSTRA 27.70 16.91 20
THEORY 0.68 1.34 20
ACTION 15.25 10.56 20
l Absolute frequences
As the numbers above indicate, con~erns with both context specific
(SPESTRA) and general strategy (GENSTRA) related issues dominate the
verbalizations coded. Statements about actions to engage in (ACfION) are also
prominent. These frequences do not reflect group membership. Before
addressing that question, however, another matter must be dealt with. This is
related to the fact that the protocols vary in length. If this is not controlled for
there is no way of telling whether group- or individual differences in the use of
the various categories are a function of cognitive characteristics or simply
having talked more. There are two ways of solving this problem. The first is
to include length of protocol as a covariate in the statistical analyses. The other
is to calculate the variables as proportions of the protocollength. The latter
alternative was selected because it is the simplest and 'purest' measure of the
two, reflecting each variable's relative importance directly.
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Table 7.4.3.: Variable Statistics Across GrouEs
CASES
Case l Case2 Case3 Case 4
VARIABLES Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ANALOG 1.561 3.62 2.15 5.03 3.45 5.28 3.06 5.62
PERSEX 2.93 6.74 2.21 5.76 1.43 3.42 10.04 15.77
SPESEC 3.36 4.58 2.94 7.84 3.96 8.52 2.43 8.95
SPESTRA 36.63 28.37 33.02 21.90 66.35 23.96 30.27 25.71
THEORY 0.87 2.15 2.58 7.05 0.68 2.52 0.00 0.00
GENEC 1.59 2.93 4.30 7.83 11.66 12.77 10.05 13.94
GENSTRA 50.95 24.16 42.20 25.67 14.03 15.70 39.80 30.41
ACTION 9.50 9.65 16.65 15.75 6.80 8.90 4.54 7.72
1 The numbers are proportions. i.e. percents. of total coded statements for each case
N=20
As can be seen in table 7.4.3., the three variables SPESTRA,
GENSTRA and ACTION dominate also when calculated as proportions.
Further, the tendency is quite stable over the various cases. The hypotheses to
be tested are about differences between the managerial and student groups. The
two groups' means, of the proportions, are reproduced in table 7.4.4.
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Table 7.4.4.: Means of Variables l
Variables Managers Students
Mean SO Mean SD
ANALOO 3.96 5.18 1.18 2.18
PERSEX 8.18 8.56 0.86 1.49
SPESEC 9.06 11.52 3.27 3.49
SPESTRA 65.68 16.45 42.06 19.27
GENEC 11.85 9.34 5.80 3.71
GENSTRA 29.64 19.15 54.02 15.75
THEORY 0.00 0.00 2.30 2.90
ACTION 16.55 10.74 29.12 15.09
l Numbers are percents of total coded statements
N = 2xlO
Inspection of table 7.4.4. reveals a pattern of relatively clear-cut group
differences (fig. 7.4.4.): The manager group scores higher on the first five
variables (ANALOG, PERSEX, SPESTRA, GENEC), while the student
group are higher on the three remaining variables (GENSTRA, THEORY,
ACTION).
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Fig.7.4.4.: Means of Variables by Groups (proportions of total scored statements)
The interpretation of the data is postponed to the discussion of the hypotheses,
but it is interesting to note that only students refer to theories (Level IV)
associated with the field of strategy. Further, this group refers relatively more
frequently to procedures (ACTION) in relation to the cases. Those two
variables, in addition to general strategy and administrative issues
(GENSTRA), are also the only ones negatively correlated with the manager
group (Table 7.2.). The question remains, however, to what degree these
results are statistically significant. This is dealt with when discussing the
hypotheses.
Apart from the quantitative aspect of the protocols, there is the
qualitative. This issue has been treated in association with the
operationalization and the construct validity of the variables. For illustrating the
content of the particular categories, one manager' s and one student' s protocol
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were translated in full from Norwegian and annotated with the actual codes
(App.4).
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CHAPTER 8
Empirical Analysis
In this chapter, the hypotheses introduced earlier are evaluated relative to the
results of the statistical analysis. There is some degree of intercollinearity in the
dependent criterion variable set (Table 5.6.). Therefore, all the criterion
variables are tested in a MANOVA model with group membership
(EXPERTOR) as predictor variable in order to take advantage of the method' s
ability to take intercorrelationships between the dependent variables into
account. Thereafter, the variables' group means and univariate F-ratios are
used to evaluate the various hypotheses.
8.1. OVERALLMANOVA MODEL
Apart from taking advantage of the MANOV A's ability to handle
intercorrelationships, the test of all the dependent criterion variables with
respect to group membership is also a test of the underlying assumption that the
experienced managers' EI differs from those of the inexperienced subjects'.
All the dependent criterion variables relate to aspects of cognitive
representations relevant for strategic issues. Consequently, testing them all
112
together in one model implies testing the overall prediction that the two groups
have different EIs.
The model results in a multivariate F ratio of 2.532 (Table 8.1.). With
8 and 10 degrees of freedom, the model reaches a probability level of .085.
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Table 8.1.: MANOVAfor Determining the Relationship Between Group Membership
and Environmental Image
UNIVARIATE F TESTS
SOURCE
SS OF MS F P
ANALOO 40.371 1 40.37 2.43 0.14
ERROR 282.272 17 16.60
PERSEX 289.08 1 289.08 7.47 0.01**
ERROR 657.73 17 38.69
SPESEC 212.54 1 212.54 2.94 0.11
ERROR 1230.01 17 72.35
SPESTRA 2221.35 1 2221.35 6.96 0.02**
ERROR 5429.00 17 319.35
GENEC 172.50 1 172.50 3.22 0.09*
ERROR 912.03 17 53.65
GENSTRA 2492.47 1 2492.47 7.93 0.01**
ERROR 5343.94 17 314.35
THEORY 25.11 1 25.11 5.63 0.03**
ERROR 75.84 17 4.46
ACTION 621.27 1 621.27 3.55 0.08*
MULrivARIATE F TEST
Pillai-Bartleu trace = 0.669
F-statistic = 2.532 OF = 8,10 P = 0.085*
l These are between-groups sums-of-squares (BSS)
2 These are within-groups sums-of-squares (WSS)
N= 19
All statistics are based on statements. being proportios of coded statements
• Indicate that the correlation is significant at the n<O.l
•• Indicate that the correlation is significant at the <x<O.OS
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The significance of this result is a function of the alpha-level accepted. The
statistical power of MANOY A is reduced by small samples and many
dependent criterion variables, as well as intercollinearity among the dependent
criterion variables. This is obviously the case for this model. Consequently,
an alpha-level of 0.1 is probably acceptable as the lower values may be overly
conservative and increase the chances for Type II error. In other words, one
may conclude that there is reasonable support for the contention that the two
groups EIs are different from one another, and that this is not just due to
chance variation in the present samples. This is in accord with the basic
assumption that is point of departure for this study in general.
One other point is of interest with respect to the MANOY A. Statistical
significance is no guarantee that the relationship detected is of a meaningful
magnitude. This question may be addressed by way of the canonical
~2 ~2
correlation squared (11mull). In the current model, the 11mull = 66.91. In other
words, group membership explains close to 67% of the variance in the criterion
variables. This must be considered a large enough share of the total variance to
count the relationship as substantial and meaningful.
So far, we have established that the two groups' EIs are different.
What may be more important is how they differ. The answer to that question
lies in the analysis of the individual dependent criterion variables. As noted
earlier, the canonical loadings, or correlations between the dependendent
criterion variables and the dependent canonical factor, indicate the various
variables' contributions to the variable set's underlying composite.
Consequently they may, as a whole, be interpreted as the El-profile. As can be
seen from fig. 8.1.1., the composite, which may be interpreted as the profile of
the experienced strategists' EI, is particularly associated with statements
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reflecting personal experiences (PERSEX), concerns with context specific
strategy related issues (SPESTRA) and economy related matters of a general
(GENEC) and domain specific (SPESEC) character.
1.00·
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0.00
-0.50
-1.00
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Fig.8.1.: Graphic Representation of Canonical Loadings
Since these statistics may be seen as ordinary factor loadings, generally
accepted rules apply as to what magnitudes to accept as cut-off points. In the
literature (see for example Hair et al., 1979), only loadings exceeding the value
1.3] is recommended to be viewed important. If this limit is applied here,
ANALOG is eliminated (Table 8.1.1.) as is SPESEC, leaving the variables
PERSEX, SPESTRA and GENE C to be considered with respect to the
experienced subjects. Further, the composite seems to be inverselyassociated
with statements reflecting concerns with context free strategy related- and
administrive issues (GENSTRA), things to do (ACTION) and theories
(THEORY). Those last three variables may be interpreted as the attributes of
the inexperienced subjects' EI.
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Table 8.1.1.: Canonical Loadings between Criterion Variables and Dependent
Canonical Factor
Criterion variables Canonical loadings
ANALOG
PERSEX
SPES EC
SPESTRA
GENEC
GENSTRA
THEORY
ACTION
0.266
0.466
0.292
0.449
0.306
-0.480
-0.404
-0.321
N= 19
From this analysis a pattern emerge relative to the general qualities
associated with the two groups' EI. However, this can only be viewed as
preliminary conclusions. After discussing the empirical results relative to the
various hypotheses we will return to the above findings, better equipped to
assess their statistical robustness.
Chapter 8: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
117
8.2. HypoTHESIS 1
In the first hypothesis it was stated that: Experienced strategists' verbal
protocols will contain more statements referring to episodic
material than those of the inexperienced.
Earlier, it was argued that episodic representations may serve as an important
resource for semantic processing, and development and change of semantic
representations. Problem solving, and by extension, the formulation of
strategy and strategic issues, are posited to be heavily dependent upon semantic
representations. Consequently, the EIs of managers experienced with strategic
work is expected to be more integrated with respect to the three representational
modes. As a result, it was argued, their verbalizations should contain more
episodic material because they probably have easier access to this mode when
working on strategic tasks.
Two variables reflect episodic material in the verbal protocols: l)
analogical prosessing (ANALOG), and 2) references to personal experiences
(PERSEX). As can be seen from studying the means of the two groups on
these variables (Table 8.2), the experienced managers have a higher content of
both variables in their protocols than the inexperienced group. However, the
difference between the two groups are
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Table 82.: Means of Variables Reflecting Episodic Material in Protoco
GROUP VARIABLES
Analog Persex
Mean SD Mean SD
MANAGERS 3.961 5.18 8.18 8.56
STUDENTS 1.18 2.18 0.86 1.49
1 Proportions of total coded statements
N=2xlO
most pronounced concerning the variable PERSEX. Further, inspection of the
univariate F-ratios (Table 8.2.1.) reveals that only this varible is significantly
related to group membership.
Table 8.2.l.: ANOVA for the Variables Reflecting Episodic Content of
Protocols. With Group Membership as Predictor Variable
STATISTICS
SOURCE
SS DF MS F P
ANALOG 40.37 l 40.37 2.43 0.14
ERROR 282.27 17 16.60
PERSEX 289.08 l 289.08 7.47 0.01**
ERROR 657.73 17 38.69
1Table is part of, and reproduced from, table 8.2.1. (general MANOVA model)
** Indicates that the correlation is significant at the a<O.OS
N= 19
The results seem to support the hypothesis. Both the variables
reflecting episodic content are higher for the experienced group, as predicted,
and the relationship between PERSEX and group membership is statistically
significant (F = 7.47, 1, P<.05). On the other hand, the content of analog
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processing found in the verbal protocols are generally low, in addition to not
being significantly different for the two groups as expected. This is an
interesting finding, because the opposite result have been reported in another,
comparable study of managers vs. students (Isenberg, 1986). In that study,
analogical processingwas seen as one of the distinguishing traits of managerial
thought. As noted above, the managers did refer to analogues more frequently
in the present study also (table 8.2.) but the difference is not statistically
significant (P=.14). Even if allowing for the small sample size, the mean is
low and do not point to this kind ofprocessing as a 'dominant trait'. One may
only speculate the reasons for this difference in empirical support as the
operationalizations used is almost identical in the two studies, at least as
reported by Isenberg (op. cit.). One reason may be the dissimilar stimuli;
Isenberg (1986) employed one complex case while the present study presented
the subjects with four very generalones. If the answer is found in the
dissimilar stimuli, then the use of analoges is not a general trait of managerial
thinking. Instead, it is a processual characteristic associated with some
dimension of the particular stimulus. In other words, analogous processing
may be an option associated with experience and chosen when the stimulus
reach a certain degree of complexity. The stimuli in the present study, as
compared with that of Isenberg's, may not have reached this level of
complexity. Therefore it was not necessary for the managers to choose the
option of analog reasoning.
Another explanation for the variable findings with respect to
analogous reasoning may be found in the cultural differences between the
subjects in the present study and those of Isenberg's study, as they belonged to
two different nationalities. It is reasonable to expect those different
backgrounds to reflect themselves in their language patterns. If this is the case,
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then the variations between the two studies concerning the use of analogous
reasoning are of most concern to comparative studies of managers belonging to
different cultures. The communication and cooperation between managers
across nationalities and cultures are example of phenomena which might be
adversely affected by such differences.
To sum up the results so far, the experienced managers seem to have
different EIs, relative to the inexperienced group. This difference is in part due
to the better access they have to episodic material that is relevant to strategic
tasks. This is particularly evident in their use of personal experiences when
discussing strategic problems. The present results disconfirm some prior
findings with respect to managers and the use of analogies, and at the same
time open up for some new interpretations of those findings.
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8.3. HYPOTHESIS 2
In the second hypothesis it was stated that: Experienced strategists'
verbal protocols will contain more statements referring to
procedural material than those of the inexperienced.
The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis was as follows: Problem solving
of the sort engaged in when dealing with strategic issues is an activity primarely
drawing upon semantic prosessing. When necessary, the semantic mode is
supported by episodic material, and procedural knowledge is accessed when
design and/or implementation of plans are called for. Again, it was argued that
experience with strategic tasks probably endows managers with effective access
to relevant procedural material, because of its salience generated by frequent
use.
As it turns out, this hypothesis is definitely not supported. The
inexperienced group has a mean (29.12) almost twice to that of the experienced
managers (16.55; Table 8.3.). The relationship between procedural content of
the verbal protocols
Table 8.3 ..: Statistics of Variable Reflecting
Procedural Material (ACflON) inProtocols
GROUP STATISTICS
Mean SD
MANAGERS
STUDENTS
16.551
29.12
10.74
15.09
1 Proportions of total coded statements
N = 2xl0
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and group membership is statistically significant (Table 8.3.1.). Since the
inexperienced student group is coded O, and the experienced manager group is
coded 1, this result means that the use of procedural material is related to the
students' verbalizations.
Table 8.3.1.: ANOV A for the Variable Reflecting Procedural Content of
Protocols (ACTION). With Group Membership as Predictor Variable 1
SOURCE STATISTICS
SS DF MS F p
ACTION
ERROR
621.27
2975.09
1
17
621.27
175.01
3.55 0.08*
1Table is part of, and reproduced from, table 8.2.1. (general MANOVA model)
* Indicates that the correlation is significant at the a<O.1
N= 19
In light of the hypothesized relationship, and the theoretical rationale
preceding it, this result is somewhat surprising and deserves some further
comment. One explanation is that the alpha-level is too high; the result reponed
is expected by chance variation alone in 10% of all cases. The counter-
argument is that lower alpha-levels would be too conservative for tests
including so small samples and high number of variables as in the present
model. Besides, a no-relationship should also be considered an unexpected
result. So how are these results to be explained?
One answer may be that, for some reason, the experienced strategists
did not see any point in generating a large number of plans, even if they could.
The proper measurement might therefore have been the quality and not the
quantity of procedural elements. This makes sense, because it is better to do
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one thing right than many things wrong. Further, experience may have
provided the managers with knowledge of the proper procedures under
particular circumstances. In other words, generating a mass of different
courses of action may simply be irrelevant for this group. The inexperienced
subjects, on the other hand, naturally lack this knowledge of the constraints that
use to apply in various situations, and the consequences of engaging in the
particular actions. Therefore, they may have felt freer to report whatever their
imagination could generate. This is exactly why 'new blood' is often sought
for in managerial positions; to loose up established ways of thinking and
conquering the 'it has been tried before' -syndrome.
The suggestion that the quality of procedural statements may
demonstrate an other pattern than their frequency can be checked against some
samples from the actual protocols. One protocol belonging to the inexperienced
group contains the following statement codes as reflecting procedural content:
"I would compute graphics illustrating how their market shares had developed
relative to ours". The next statement is also coded as procedural, and belongs
to the same subject: "[if I was the manager here], then I would have to get those
things [generating analyses of competitors] going in order to find the problem,
and from what I found out about the problems I would choose reactions in
order to reconquer the marketshares". The first statement is an example of a
quite redundant suggestion containing no substantive value. The subject is
using his imagination and comes up with an idea that is not wrong, but on the
other hand it is in a sense outside the sphere of relevance. The other statement
is highly general, and could be made by anyone having glanced through the
introductory chapter of a text-book in marketing or business strategy. Again, it
carries no informative value except for common sense, and may be generated
without concern about any practical constraints. The next couple of statements
Chapter 8: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
l24
are taken from protocols of the experienced subjects: "Probably, I would also
work on the organization to shape it up jar the goals I had set up, because that
is decisive-ij you want to reach them the people must share your belief that
the goals are realistic and reachable"; "An alternative strategy could be that I let
him aquire this expensive funding and underbid on loans so that he did not
manage to take his preferred interest on loans, jar example., and squeeze him
that way". The first statement is an example of a procedure of a middle-level
abstraction, where the information-content is richest. It is a suggestion
carrying useful information in specifying constraints with respect to the
implementation aspect. The second statement is illustrative of knowledge of
context-specific procedures that takes into account factual constraints and
probable outcomes of certain lines of action.
To sum it all up, the hypothesis was not supported by the empirical
results. In fact, the results were opposite to what was predicted. The most
probable reason for this is that the managers' EI are better adapted to a real-
world situation where a host of practical constraints render many options
irrelevant. This could explain the lower frequency of procedural statements in
their protocols. Besides, the practical nature of their work probably induces in
them a habit of thinking in a middle-level of abstraction, further limiting the
range of options they consider. In contrast to this group, the inexperienced
students would not be restrained by other factors than their own imagination
and common sense. In this light, it is not surprising that their protocols contain
a higher number of procedural statements.
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8.4. HYPOTHESIS 3
In the third hypothesis it was stated that: Experienced strategists' verbal
protocols will contain more statements reflecting context specific
semantic-representational material than those of the
inex perienced.
With this hypothesis, we are moving over to the semantic representational
mode. In this mode, it is proposed, most managerial problem solving is done.
The other two representational modes are conceptualized as supportive
resources to the semantic. Because of its centrality, the last three hypotheses
are tied to the semantic mode and its different abstractionallevels.
Experience is, by necessity, domain related. Empirical studies were
cited demonstrating high levels of skills to be domain-specific and related to
experience with the particular field in question. For example, it was noted
earlier that chess masters, as a group, are not more intelligent than novice
players, and their memory for game positions was particularly efficient only
with respect to games they recognized from earlier exposure. Experts are
masters of their field but not everything else as well. On the background of the
above line of argument, it is predicted that the experienced subjects' protocols
will contain relatively more contextual material, because of the salience of such
knowledge relative to strategic problems.
Contextual knowledge (Level II) is operationalized by the variables
SPESEC (domain specific economy related concerns) and SPESTRA (domain
related strategy related concerns). As expected, the means of those two
variables are higher for the experienced subjects (Table 8.4.). However, the
relationship between
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Table 8.4.: Means of Variables Reflecting Domain Specific Material
GROUP VARIABLES
Spesec
Mean
Spestra
SD Mean SD
MANAGERS
STUDENTS
9.061 11.52
3.27 3.49
65.68
42.06
16.45
19.27
1 Proportions of total coded statements
N=2XI0
SPESEC and group membership do not reach statistical significance (Table
8.4.1.). SPESTRA, on the other hand, do (F = 6.96, 17, P<.05). In other
words, the
Table 8.4.1.: ANOVA for Testing the Relationship Between Domain
Specific Material and Group Membership 1
STATISTICS
SOURCE
SS DF MS F P
SPES EC 212.54 1 212.54 2.94 0.11
ERROR 1230.01 17 72.35
SPESTRA 2221.35 1 2221.35 6.96 0.02*
ERROR 5429.00 17 319.35
1Table is part of, and reproduced from, table 8.2.1. (general MANOYA model)
* Indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.1
N= 19
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results support the hypothesis, but this is only due to the relationship between
statements reflecting strategy related concerns tied to context and experience.
Surprisingly, economy related statements specific for the banking industry
constitute a very small part of the bank-managers' verbalizations ex = 3.27).
On the basis of this result one must conclude that domain specific
economical issues are not judged relevant by the managers nor the students in
solving strategic problems. Or alternatively, none of the groups posess this
kind of knowledge. This is somewhat puzzling, as strategic matters are
inherently tied to economic parameters. It is even more surprising considering
this is the banking industry with the wealth of specialized concepts referring to
economic issues employed by workers of this field. Somehow at least the
managers, who presumably have this conceptual apparatus accessible, do not
judge this domain to be relevant for strategic analysis. This may reflect
learning of a substantial nature with respect to banks and their relations to their
environment, on the part of the managers. On the other hand, it may as well
indicate just the opposite; that the managers have not integrated well enough
knowledge pertaining to strategic issues. Some support for this contention may
be found in the crisis facing the Norwegian banking business at the time the
data were gathered, the cause of which has later been identified, in large part,
as incompetent management (Dagens Næringsliv, 14 mars 1990).
When using contextual knowledge, the experienced strategists seem to
prefer things that are related to their industry as such. Some light may be
thrown on this result by sampling some of the actual statements: "Within a
local market we see changes in how and where people live, in the choice of
careers and it might be that my earlier localization, my earlier services are not so
attractive any longer i relation to these changes". Here, the subject is referring
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to phenomena he has observed in the market, and is concerned about his
products and how they match the needs of the customer. What is expressed
here, then, is a concern with adaption to the specific environment of the
banking industry. Another example: "If you look at itfrom a historical point
of view, the banks knewmuch less about the status of a particular branch than
now". Here, the subject is commenting on the management of local branches,
and the small degree of control that Norwegian banks typically have exercised
over their subsidiaries. As a matter of fact, one manager remarked that banks
typically, even now, have little insight into what business areas they really
profit from. In both these examples, the subjects are expressing themselves
authoritatively based on close familiarity with the banking business. In contrast
to this, the inexperienced subjects, even when concerned with context specific
material, use information that may be gathered through following the media
coverage of the banking business and their competence as students of
economics and business administration: "Well, here it says you are losing
market shares-the question is if it is about the deposit-market or loans-
market". And another example: "I think, then it would be largely a matter of
macroeconomic-that is macroeconomicpolitics would have great importance
for how large the margin of the interest-what kinds of restrictions and all that
which the authorities decides on-to what degree they will go in for free
interest and -". In the first statement, the subject merely repeats concepts that
have become commom knowledge with respect to the banking business,
through the coverage by popular media. In the second statement, the subject
seems to be groping for some solution by combining the very general principle
of macroeconomic constraints on all kinds of enterprises and the rather well-
known source of banks' income; the marginof the interest The statement does
not lead to a clear-cut conclusion, even though the intention behind it is
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perceivable. In this case, then, there may be some reason to believe that the
experienced strategists' protocols contain qualitatively better as well as
quantitatively more statements relevant for the hypothesis.
In sum, the hypothesis was supported by the empirical results. For
some reason, statements reflecting context specific economy related issues did
exhibit the direction but not the strength of association with experience that was
predicted. On the one hand, this may reflect some adaptional function on the
part of the managers' cognition: Those may simply not be important matters at
all, at least in the context of the cases that the subjects were presented. On the
other hand, the results may indicate an area potentially of importance, but
largely overlooked by the subjects. It is impossible to decide which answer is
the correct one, but the issue is of enough interest to warrant further
investigation.
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8.5. HYPOTHESIS 4
In the fourth hypothesis it was stated that: Inexperienced subjects' verbal
protocols will contain more statements reflecting context free
semantic-representational material than those of the experienced.
The rationale for this hypothesis lies in the understanding that cognition is
organized in levels. As was demonstrated in Hypothesis 3, experienced
subjects made use of a basic context specific level of abstraction more
frequently than the inexperienced. It was argued earlier that the students,
having roughly the same educational background as the managers, would
probably compensate for the lack of domain specific material through the use of
more general-level knowledge. Allthough this level of information is less rich
in its implications, it is still possible to relate to problems with such knowledge
by resorting to general problem solving strategies (Greeno, & Simon, 1988).
This level of representational abstraction was measured by two
variables: 1) GENEC; economy related statements generally applicable to all
kinds of businesses, and 2) GENSTRA; statements related to organizations and
their adaption to the internal and external environment Both variables are at a
level of abstraction that makes them applicable to all kinds of industries, and
they are both relevant for working with strategic problems.
Inspection of the two groups' means (Table 8.5.) reveal that the
results are not quite as expected. Statements referring to economic issues are
actually higher for the experienced manager group, which is contrary to the
predicted direction. With respect to GENSTRA, however, the results conform
to expectations. These results are exactly
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Table 8.5.: Means of Variables Reflecting Context Free Material
GROUP VARIABLES
Genec Genstra
Mean SD Mean SD
MANAGERS 11.851 9.34 29.64 19.15
STUDENTS 5.80 3.77 54.02 15.75
l Proportions of total coded statements
N=2XIO
the opposite to what was found for the domain specific level. Before
commenting further on this point, however, we will look at the variables' F-
ratios. These inform us that both GENE C and GENSTRA are significantly
related to group membership (Table 8.5.1.). In other words, the hypothesis is
supported allthough the results leave GENEC for further analysis.
Table 8.5.1.: ANOV A for Testing the Relationship Between Context Free
Material and Group Membership l
STATISTICS
SOURCE
SS DF MS F p
GENEC 172.50 1 172.50 3.22 0.09*
ERROR 912.03 17 53.65
GENSTRA 2492.47 1 2492.47 7.93 0.01**
ERROR 5343.94 17 314.35
l Table is part of, and reproduced from, table 8.2.1. (general MANOYA model)
* Indicates that the correlation is significant at the Cl<O.1
•• Indicates that the correlation is significant at the a<O.05
N= 19
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The experienced strategists are clearly more prone to discuss the cases
in relation to general economy related issues (GENEC) than the inexperienced
subjects. This may be accounted for by the reasonable contention that strategy,
in the world of managers, are about dispositions closely tied to costs and
revenues. Students, on the other hand, probably don't perceive this
relationship as strongly, because without the proper experiences strategy and
economy are two separate disiplines. At least this is the impression one gets by
studying a typical business school curriculum and most relevant textbooks.
Some support for this argument is found in the fact that very few students are
able to integrate economical concerns in their Business Strategy tests13. This
implies that the managers' EI are better adaptedto the world that they are facing
in their daily work because economical issues are so central to their decisions
relative to strategy. The weak relationship between domain specific economical
concerns (SPESEC) and group membership found in Hypothesis 3 may
actually confirm this line of reasoning, because GENE C are mostly statements
about economical results, while SPESEC are statements of a more technical
nature. The managers' EI, as exhibited here, are therefore developed with
respect to financial results's. Some samples from the actual protocols may
illustrate this point: "In other words, I have lost because I aquired an expensive
funding and he [a competior] has lost since he didn't get the money [deposits]
that he wanted". Another: "Let' s say the accounts indicate one have ten
millions in profits from trading foreign valuta: What one forgot earlier was that
13Based on personal communication with professors censoring this kind of tests.
14 One interesting aside here is that the current crisis of the Norwegian banking
industry is often explained as a result of the managers' focus on acquisition of market shares
and their concurrent neglect of their 'craft' of sound banking principles associated with fmance
management
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financing a portifolio of, say a hundred millions with an average of 16%
interest, would come to about 16 millions-leaving a loss of six millions
instead, in addition to other costs like salaries, telephone, telex and all such
things". In both these instances, the subjects (experienced strategists) are
concerned with economy related issues relative to strategy, and it is clearly
results in the fonn of economical consequences for the finn that is in focus.
Allthough the inexerienced subjects also touch this matter, they do so less
frequently and are often quite vague or simplistic when referring to such
matters: "I don' t know--! couldpossibly think of some kind of value chains-
but I am not sure how this might be applied". And another: "Well, it might be
that you found yourself in such a position that you had offered too many loans
to people you didn't know and thereby could have some losses". In the first
statement, the subject evidently recalls a concept he feels is relevant, but it is
not really integrated with other kinds of knowledge, so the end-result of his
effort is not very useful. The other statement is quite relevant, but compared to
the experienced subjects above it is very simplistic and carry little informative
value.
In sum, the hypothesis is supported by the empirical results. The
inexperienced subjects' verbalizations are significantly more context free in
terms of statements referring to organizations' internal or external
environments. This is taken as indicative of their EIs being less adapted to
strategic problems. Contrary to expectations, the experienced strategists'
verbalizations more often than the students' contain context free economy
related matters. This is interpreted as indicative of EIs more oriented towards
actual economical results, on behalf of the experienced group.
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8.6. HYPOTHESIS 5
In the fifth hypothesis it was stated that: Inexperienced subjects' verbal
protocols will contain more statements reflecting theory based
semantic-representational material than those of the experienced.
As was pointed out, theories of strategy and strategicmanagementmay be seen
as cognitive representational contents at still a higher level of abstraction than
context free elements. Suchmaterial can serve at least two purposes: 1) it is an
inventory of principles from which to deduce ideas at lower and more
applicable levels of thinking, and 2) it is a stock of 'ready made' schemas
which may be applied in order to recognize and understand strategic stimuli.
As noted earlier, the literature is of small help in predicting whether there
should be goup differences with respect to the use of such material, or
alternatively, which group should use it the most. On the other hand, it was
argued that the inexperienced subjects probably would verbalize this kind of
statements the most, since theories probably are most salient with this group
due to their status as students.
Inspection of the groups' means on this variable (Table 8.6.)
demonstrates that the inexperienced group's protocols do contain more
statements referring to theories. While it is used sparingly by this group (X =
2.30), the managers don't refer to theories at
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Table 8.6.: Means of Variable THEORY
Group Statistics
Mean SD
MANAGERS 0.001 0.00
STUDENTS 2.30 2.90
1 Proportions of total coded statements
N=2XI0
all. Evidently, this result supports the hypothesis. But the number of
statements is low, even for the inexperienced group. Therefore it is necessary
to check the group difference against what would be expected by chance
variation.
Table 8.6.1.: ANOV A for Testing the Relationship Between References to
Theory and Group Membership 1
STATISTICS
SOURCE
SS DF MS F p
THEORY
ERROR
25.11
75.84
1
17
25.11
4.46
5.63 0.03**
1 Table is part of, and reproduced from, table 8.2.1. (general MANOVA model)
•• Indicates that the correlation is significant at the a<O.05
N= 19
As demonstrated by table 8.6.1. the relationship between references to
theory and group membership is statistically significant (F = 5.63, P<.05). In
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other words, the hypothesis is supported by the results. Since there was some
ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of this relationship there may be
some value in studying some of the actual verbalizations contained in this
category: "With respect to the environment I think I would use a Porter line of
thinking as frame of reference, and look into what competitive forces there may
be". And another: "A third issue would be what Porter calls suppliers". In the
first statement, the subject is evidently searching for some kind of guidance for
his/her thinking, and finds it in a well-known author on competitive strategy.
In the second statement, the subject seems to refer to the same conceptual
model, and places his/her ideas in that context. In other words, the subjects
use relevant theory to guide their cognitive processing. Since the managers
don't utilize this kind of material, they have to make use of some other frame of
reference. In light of the other findings reported earlier, it is probable that they
are guided by their experience-based contextual knowledge. Finding your way
in your own city is not dependent on knowledge about the general architecture
of cities. A tourist, on the other hand, is helped by knowing that reasonable
priced motels are usually found in the outskirts of a city, and that most
entertainment is usually found downtown.
In sum, the hypothesis is supported by the empirical results. The
inexperienced subjects refer to theory, probably in order to find some guidance
for their problem solving processes in an area where they lack familiarity.
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CHAPTER 9
Discussion of Findings
9 .1. RESULTS OF THE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses addressed the issue of the relationship between experience and
certain qualities of managerial EIs, or cognitive representations relative to
strategic issues. Those hypotheses were tested empirically through the
analysis of verbal protocols produced by two groups with varying degrees of
experience, in response to four written cases designed to emulate important
dimensions of strategic stimuli. This resulted in the following fmdings:
1) The EIs of experienced strategists differed from those of the
inexperienced. In other words, the managers did use the three representational
modes different from the students; experience is associated with attributes of
cognitive structures as measured by verbal output. The importance of this
. finding is twofold. First, it demonstrates that the experienced strategists, as a
group, respond differentlyto strategic stimuli relative to the inexperienced
subjects. This will probably also be true for their responses to actual strategy
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related situations, even though external valididy is not given priority in the
present study. Second, the finding implies that experience is not only growing
older; it is also associated with an adaption of cognition to the demands posed
by a particular environment
2) The experienced strategists made more frequent use of the episodic
representational mode. This finding conformed to what was expected from the
conceptual model used to generate the hypotheses, and is of importance for the
following reasons: First, personal experiences must be of some use, since
practised strategists use them at all in solving strategic problems. Second, the
finding supports the conjecture that episodic memory can serve as a resource
for the semantic. Taken together, these points imply that personal experiences
are a resource in themselves with respect to working with such problem
domains as business strategy.
3) With respect to the semantic mode, experience was associated with
more frequent use of contextual knowledge pertaining to organizations' internal
and external environments, and economical results. In contrast to this profile,
the inexperienced subjects seemed to compensate through the application of
theories, and context free knowledge pertaining to the environment. These
results are interesting because they imply that the semantic mode, by itself, is
different for experienced strategists. The importance of this point lies in the
centrality afforded to this mode relative to the other two, in the conceptual
model. It is, after all, in this mode that the symbolic manipulation of the
environment, so important for intelligent adaption and problem solving, takes
place. The preference for contextual material tell us that domain specific
knowledge afford some kind of advantage over the context free, since the
experienced strategists have the same educational background as the
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inexperienced. Earlier, it was argued that this advantage probably had to with
the opportunity for the use of stronger problem solving strategies and more
efficient problem frames. The more frequent use of general economy related
issues and results is interpreted as an indication of a higher integration between
knowledge and purpose; in the world of business, growth and survival is the
main objective, and the experienced strategists' cognition seem to have adapted
to such circumstances. It is interesting to contrast the inexperienced subjects'
cognition relative to those of the experienced: Those are dominated by
generalities far away from any particular circumstances and purposes other than
solving the cases, and seeking authoritative support in theories rather than the
phenomenal world. Again, experience seems to be associated with interesting
cognitive qualities relative to particular circumstances, adding to the subjects'
level of competence.
4) Concerning the procedural mode, the results are less conclusive.
On the one hand, the empirical results were opposite to what was predicted:
The verbalization of procedural material was less frequent for the experienced
strategists. The interpretation of this result is, however, somewhat more
complicated for this mode. Procedural statements will to a large degree be
conclusions in the form of what to do, given by the subjects argumentation up
to that point. If it is the case that the experienced strategists have a better
knowledge of the constraints that is usually under operation in the given
circumstances, the present result is the natural one. Consequently the quality,
and not the quantity, should be considered for measuring this mode. Since this
study did not take the quality aspect under consideration it is not possible to
confirm this line of reasoning. Still, the finding has some value in this light
since the recommendation of how to proceed in a given situation is very close
to an actual strategic formulation.
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It has been emphasized that associations between variables, and not
causal relationships were tested. On the other hand, it is still reasonable to
speculate that the differences found is a function of experience; it certainly is
not the other way around and the internal validity is controlled for to a certain
degree at least. In addition, this speculation is supported by other research on
expertise (see for example Lesgold, 1984). Concerning the actual qualities
found, these may not be conceived of as the total set of actual distinguishing
traits. The reason is of course that what was found in this respect was
detennined by the hypotheses that guided the research effort. Still, the picture
emerges of the managers as problem formulators and -solvers that make use of
a cognitive apparatus tuned to a particular dom~n. Strategic management may
be seen as a function which has adaption to circumstances as the ultimate goal.
In this process, the reduction of uncertainty and risk is of prime concern for
the manager (Thompson, 1967). The managers' environmental images are
probably developed in response to these challenges, and may therefore be seen
as one way of controlling uncertainty. Viewed this way, experiential
'intelligence', as described here, becomes a valuable asset for the firm to
develop and protect
The study does not answer the question of whether the experienced
strategists' representations are better than those of the inxperienced subjects'.
Still, some tentative conclusions can be reached by studying a typical protocol
from one subject belonging to each group.
Chapter 9: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
143
9.2. EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENæS IN PERFORMANCE
While the analysis of performance would demand careful independent expert
evaluation of the protocols, some flavor of the differences may be had by
sampling one manager and one student protocol for illustrative study (Appendix
4). One notes that the manager, in reflecting on Case 1, promptly categorizes
the situation as a problematic one (Line 7), and a little later has something to
say about the circumstances under which the problems might be serious (Lines
13 -16). Inspecting the student protocol, one notes the contrasting concern
with what the reasons for the situation might be and what information he/she
would like to have in order to proceed (Lines 4 - 24, which are the complete set
ofresponses for the this case). This behavior may be explained this way: The
manager recognized the rudimentary description of the situation presented to
him/her as belonging to some category associated with a schema for 'problem
situations', and used this knowledge structure to generate the data needed for
elaborating on the situation and even generating some actions to take in relation
to it (Lines 40 - 52). Whatever the processual explanation, the result is
evidently a more efficient handling of the material.
In Case 2 the difference is at least as pronounced. The manager
systematically tabulates the information he/she would need, where to find it and
how he would proceed. In contrast, the student is quite vague and superficial
in these respects (for instance: "Then there would be something like getting in
touch with them in writing -"), Again, this is an indication that the experienced
manager has access to knowledge and cognitive structures making possible a
more efficient behavior relative to the case.
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A somewhat dramatic effect of having access to the right kind of
knowledge is demonstrated in Case 3. While the student is concerned with
turning a problematic situation (weak customers) into a better one through long
range planning, the manager do not perceive the situation as problematic at all.
This is because he/she knows that the authorities subsidize the loans in
question, and he/she is prepared to cooperate with other institutions in order to
secure a profit for the bank. This approach may be seen as illustrative of a
completely different way of solving strategic problems based upon contextual
knowledge. The manager knows what to do because he/she knows the
consequences as well as the contingencies of the particular situation. This is
reminiscent of the problem solving strategy called 'Working Forward' by
Newell & Simon (1972), being one of the most powerful strategies of experts
but completely dependent on concrete experience.
The differences in perception and how to handle the situation are also
evident in the last case. The student explains the background of the situation as
he/she sees it, and then very generally proposes some administrative actions.
The manager, on the other hand, acknowledges the constraints inherent in this
situation but points out that it really do not signify any real change of affairs.
This difference in responses may be taken as indication of the manager's
'deeper' processing of the case material, giving him/her a picture of the
situation not evident in the surface of the case. Other research, with problems
from the physics and mathematics domain, have also concluded that this may
be the case (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981).
This admittedly sketchy comparison of the two subjects do not offer
evidence for the conjecture that experienced managers are more efficient or
clever strategists than the students. It does, however, illustrate how the
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differences already documented in the testing of the hypotheses may work in
practise. Still, the fact that the findings seem to conform with results from
other studies do of course not reduce their validity.
The present study do not address the causality issue: It is impossible
on the basis of the present finding to state that experience caused the differences
in the EIs. It simply indicates how the human mind seems to respond to
prolonged exposure to a particular field of practise. Since the experienced
strategist group consisted of individuals raised to relatively high positions
within the banks, presumable on the basis of merit, it is still possible to raise
some temporary suggestions regarding matters like managerial training, -
development and recruitment. The results also have some implications for the
functions of management teams and Strategic Issue Management. In short, the
results presented point to some directions for practical applications, in addition
to suggesting some ideas for further resarch efforts.
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CHAPTER 10
Applications and Future Research
10.1. MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
Recently, the topic of business schools' training, and the education and
development of managers have received some attention (Leavitt, 1989; Marais,
1982). Earlier, it was simply a matter of what courses to include in the
curriculums of the business schools educating the managers or managers to-be.
Now, however, there is a growing concern that the leaders need skills not
easily acquired through conventional training. One of them is that of strategic
problem finding and -formulation which is closely related to innovation
(Haukedal, 1987b) and the perception of weak strategic signals (Ansoff, 1980;
Ansoff, 1975).
The results of this study suggest that the learning of strategy related
principles, and other theoretical models, are not enough to prepare one for
work with strategic tasks. If the nature of the managers' environmental
images, as contrasted with those of the students, are a valid indication of what
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should be sought for concerning strategic competencies, then a relevant set of
personal experiences, contextual knowledge, purposeful thinking and,
probably, procedures for implementation, are at least as important as learning
theoretical strategic models. The results from the present study seems to
advocate the development of both cognitive structures and knowledge. The
results also point to the utility of being conscious of ones own cognition, as
one's output clearly depends on structures and processes here. It is by no
means enough with a determination to accomplish. The question then emerges
of how to ensure potential strategists with this kind of competencies?
One answer is of course that education gives the students the
conceptual groundwork and experiences gives them the rest. The problem with
this line of thinking is that the skills in question are not legitimized by the
educational system. Therefore, energy will not be directed to its development
later on. In addition, a large part of the students will probably end up with
strategy related responsibilities before they have had the opportunity to develop
their experience to any degree. There is even some evidence suggesting that
individuals giving priority to entrepreneurial tasks within organizations are
rewarded with shorter paths to the top (McCall, & Segrist, 1980). That would
also imply that top managers could end up being the people with the least
experiential knowledge and therefore being the least competent! Moreover,
leaders' career patterns seem to be characterized by frequent moves across
different businesses which do equip them with varied, but also more superficial
experience relative to their work.
There seems to be some reason, then, to argue that the development of
experiential knowledge should be formalized. This is not the place to discuss
that problem in depth, but the results of the study suggest that self-involvement
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is necessary. In a learning context this might be secured through the use of
simulation and long-range programs containing both work with projects,
regular theory courses and some kind of counsel. In addition, the use of
experienced managers as patrons for those less experienced is probably an
effective way of sharing practical insights. Last, the use of tests and some kind
of encounters could provide subjects with information about their own patterns
of thinking. Some of the suggestions above could be implemented in students'
curriculae, while others are probably best included in the development of
subjects engaged in practical work.
10.2. MANAGEMENT RECRUITMENf
The search for and choice of managers is a growing industry, reflecting the
belief in their importance for the organization. The methods used to select
those individuals reveal the current opinions on what make an individual an
effective manager: A whole range of tests focus upon personality traits and
attitudes, simulations address their decision-making qualities and researching
past record is a way of capitalizing on some assumed stable personality.
Relative to this study and the results presented here, these procedures
fail in one respect. They all ignore the fact that as strategic decision-makers
managers have to relate to one particular environment with its own laws, actors
and parameters. In addition, when the thinking they are paid to do is developed
in another field or business there is no way they can utilize it before having the
kind of experience that is the reason why they are hired in the first place! The
problem is perhaps not important for all levels nor roles of management. The
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manager has many tasks of which decision-making is only one (Mintzberg,
1973). Therefore, these objections are only relevant when the manager to be
hired is to be directly involved in the perception and formulation of strategic
issues, and where the individual is of prime importance. When this is the case,
the organization is probably best advised to search for new managers within
their own industry.
10.3. MANAGEMENTTEAMS
If cognitive power, as a function of experiential knowledge, really is important
for the firm then this has some implications for the composition of management
teams. First of all, increasing the number of individuals do not automatically
make the team more efficient because cognitive power is an individual trait that
cannot be emulated by a collective. This is a principle well known from
computer soft-ware developing projects (Brooks, 1975). Second, the
communication in such groups is partly responsible for the validation and
development of individual knowledge and belief patterns (Schutz, 1967;
Weick, 1979; Weick, 1979a). Therefore, it is essential that they contain
individuals with domain specific experience to ensure that this kind of data is
not overlooked. Third, individuals without this kind of experience should also
participate because in such a forum there is potential for transmission of
learning through dialogue.
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10.4. STRATEGICISSUE MANAGEMENT (SIM)
The results also have some implications for the management of strategic issues.
Recently, there have been some interest in organizational systems dealing with
the detection and response to weak:or developing strategic signals (c.f. Ansoff,
1975; Ansoff, 1980). Practical directions on how to design such systems have
focused on where to find information, how to systematize it and report it (see
Rentro, 1982; Brown, 1981; Ansoff, 1980). What has been missing in these
contributions is a concern with the actors doing the interpretation of this
information. The results of the present study at least inform us that it is not
unimportant who do this work. More specifically, experience in the domain of
the organization probably influences how the material is interpreted.
In designing MIS, therefore, the factor of experience somehow has to
be considered at least in the evaluation stage of the processing of the gathered
data. A perusal of the methods available shows this stage to be 'a crucial one.
In one such system, for example, one is advised to gather data, assess their
implications for importance as well as timing relative to the organization' s
activities (Ansoff, 1980). While the system is quite simple to administer (at
least in principle), it obviously is quite demanding when it comes to deciding
their meaning for the organization. It is here that the element of experience may
have a significant influence. It was pointed out earlier that the human mind is
constrained in its capacity for handling information. Experience with the
strategy domain, on the other hand, has been demonstrated to covary with
cognitive structures and content, proven (c.f. Chi, Feltowich, & Glaser, 1983;
Weaver, & Carrol, 1984) to enhance information processing in other domains.
This points to the usefulness of including people with that kind of competence
in MIS-systems, preferably in its later stages of evaluation and synthesis. This
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advise is in direct opposition to the tendency to assign this kind of operations to
freshly educated MBAs.
10.5. THEORETICAL lMPLiCA TIONS
The theoretical point of departure for this study was taken from the literature
about business strategy, cognitive representation and expert problem solvers.
The goal was to have a better understanding of the association between
experience with strategic tasks and images of the environment accessed when
working with strategy related problems. Several findings emerged. First, the
use of episodic material was demonstrated to covary with managerial group
membership as expected. This is interpreted as support for the view that
human cognitive representation is a multimodal function, and serves as further
validation of that construct since earlier research has largely been confined to
laboratory experiments and the learning of nonsense-word lists (Tulving,
1985). Second, experience seems to be associated with the kind of cognitive
structures needed for efficient information processing with a mental apparatus
limited in its capacities. The preference for contextual knowledge and concern
with economic results are cases in point. These are qualities of experienced
problem solvers' representations that have been hypothesized from studies of
such individuals' processing strategies. The representations as such have not,
however, been studied in the context of experience. Therefore, the present
study is informative in the context of expert problem solving. Moreover, most
such studies have focused on well-defined and structured problem situations
like the 'Tower of Hanoi' puzzle, while relatively few have concerned
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themselves with the kind of unstructured and ambiguous problem situations
confronting managers. This study, therefore, serves to extend such research to
more applied domains like management of organizations.
One other perspective deserves to be mentioned. As noted in the
beginning of the theory chapter, most studies of managerial thinking so far
have concerned themselves with various shortcomings and biases. In contrast,
this study has focused upon the thinking of presumably efficient 'thinkers' in
order to elicit some principles that could be used for the development of
efficiency rather than just limit a problem. In that sense, the results of the
present study are at least a step towards a better understanding of a neglected
focus for resarch in the field of strategic management.
10.6. FUTURE RESEARCH
Implications for future research are found from two considerations. First,
weaknesses of the present study may be improved in future efforts. Second,
some of the findings point to further development of the ideas serving as point
of departure for this study.
With respect to the first issue several refinements could be made, rendering the
empirical results more robust. It is probably unrealistic to opt for a classical
experiment with random assignment of subjects to the various groups in the
kind of questions pursued here. On the other hand, it is possible to operate
with more levels and kinds of experience. For example, managers of different
levels within the organization and with various extents of experience could be
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included in the study, in order to control more efficiently for the experience
variable. Likewise, both BA students, professors of this field and people not
affiliated at all with business administration or economics, could be included in
order to control for the different levels of abstract knowledge. The inclusion of
'naive' subjects would be valuable for the conclusions regarding inexperienced
people's representations. Such a design would offer a more complex, but also
a more informative, measure of the 'experience' variable. A study with that
many factors would necessitate a larger sample of subjects. As was pointed out
earlier, the sample of this study is already a bit too small, resulting in reduced
statistical power. Therefore, having larger samples is certainly a requirement
for later efforts. Concerning the reliability of measures, the chosen procedure
could be refined by having assistants unfamiliar with the reseach hypotheses
doin all of the coding. In the present case, I did the bulk of the work myself,
only controlled by another person coding a sample of the material. While the
intercoder reliability was high, construct validity is weakened by this
procedure. As pointed out earlier, construct validity is to some degree
indetermined in this study. It could be enhanced by adding other types of
stimuli to the situation. The most difficult construct to measure is that of
episodic referents. A special study could be made concerning the
correspondence between verbal reports and the activation of experiential
memories. This could be attained through measuring differential brain activity
in connection with verbal output. Having access to such empirical material
would greatly enhance the construct validity of this measure. The various
levels of knowledge could be measured more validly with the help of
techniques such as the Q-sort methodology or the Rep-grid. Both these
techniques allow for intraindividual grouping and hierarchical ordering of
concepts. The procedural mode should be studied from a qualitative point of
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view, in order to assess the contention that experienced subjects have
qualitatively better representations with respect to this mode, and that this is the
reason why they use them more sparingly. Behind the study lies the basic
premise that the experienced subjects' EIs are better and more efficient than
those of the inexperienced. This belief should be tested, which might be
attained through having an expert panel evaluate the protocols of the
experienced against those of the inexperienced. One could also take actual,
real-life decisions and present the background information in such situations as
cases to students. Their decisions might then be compared to the actual ones,
made by experienced strategists. Again, the two sets of decisions could be
evaluated by an expert panel. While the design of the present studyoffered
data on the differences between experienced and inexperienced subjects, a
longitudinal design would give more reliable data concerning the causal role of
experience in accounting for the development of the environmental images.
Such an approach would also provide one with a more complete understanding
of the role of different events like training, education, management
development programs, crises and problems experienced and projects engaged
in, just to mention a few.
The above discussion of implications take weaknesses of the study as
point of departure. The results offer some opportunities for future
developments as well. The most important of them is probably related to the
contextual nature of the experienced strategists' EIs, and their relative lack of
theory and abstract principles. On the one hand, the results may be interpreted
as indicative of an effective and functional adaption to the demands of their
work. On the other hand, the results may reflect attributes of the particular
sample studied here. The question is then whether particularly successful
strategists would demonstrate the same pattern of attributes; if the media and
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other similar sources of information is taken seriously, there is reason to
believe that the variation concerning competence within this group is large. The
best way to address this problem is to select strategists with the qualities
referred to, and the practical problems associated with securing their
cooperation is probably the hardest to solve.
One other line of investigation implied by the results reported here is
related to experience. If the differences found in experienced strategists' EIs
are valuable, and if they are related to experience, then it would be of value to
accellerate the process labelled as experience. Some paralell may be found in
research on the process of psychoterapy, where techniques like self-
management have been found to speed the process. Within this context, one
may speculate whether corresponding techniques might be developed for
inclusion into management development programs, in order to compress the
time-span needed for the cultivation of the kind of cognitive structures reported
here. Actually, very little is known about such programs and particularly about
their effects. Considering the resources channeled into such activities and the
importance of strategy for organizational growth and survival, this is an area of
great potential gain.
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ApPENDIX 1
CODING MANUAL
Manual for coding the verbal protocols
182
INSTRUCTIONS
The following is a manual for the coding of a particular set of verbal protocols
transcribed from audio tapes. The subjects are analyzing and responding to four
problems having to do with business strategy. The intent of this analysis is to code
the occurrence of particular classes of statements according to some specified
categories.
In order to enhance uniformity of coding, some guide-lines of a general
nature are presented beneath. Please read them carefully and follow the instructions.
1. The protocols consist of numbered sentences/statements. You
code the whole sentence. Try to think of the statements as units of
thought with one recognizable characteristic.
2. You may look to the preceding and/or following sentences in order
to understand the meaning of a given statement, when necessary.
3. Read carefully the descriptions of the various categories; it is
important that you have a thorough understanding of their
meaning-content. This is made easier if you also look at the
examples, together with their annotations.
4. In this manual, you will also find a glossary which may be referred
to in order to identify key concepts associated with the specific
categories. As the glossary is not exhaustive, it must be thought of
as indicative and not decisive.
5. Use the supplied coding sheets when analyzing the protocols, and
follow the guidlines there.
183
GENERAL S1RAlEGY RELAlED KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge of general strategic principles
Statements related to strategically relevant circumstances or matters. These are
observations not restricted to any industry in particular, in the sense that they reflect
knowledge of general principles which may be applied to all kinds of
industries/businesses. They may focus upon the internal or external environment of
an organization, matters pertaining to choice of or navigation within domains of
action, and other broad areas of concern related to business strategy. General
administrative issues are also comprised by this category.
Example: "I will have to know more about this industry's degree of
competition".
Remarks: The subject is here focusing on the organization's external environment,
and reveals knowledge associated with the element of competition, and its importance
for a finn's strategy. It is general in the sense that such knowledge is applicable to all
kinds of businesses.
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Glossary
Nyetableringer
Konkurrenter
Omgivelser
Kunder
Produkt
Markedsandeler
Service
Kundeforhold
Markedet
Potensielle kunder
Kunders behov
Interne styrker
Interne svakheter
Trusler
Muligheter
Markedsandel
Strategisk kjerne
185
General economy concerns
Statements expressing concerns or references to economic matters of a general type.
These verbalizations are of a sort which apply to all kinds of enterprises regardless of
industry, as long as economic matters are relevant at all.
Example: "This is the kind of situation that calls for a review of the cash-flow
situation" .
Remark: The subject is concerned about an economy related theme which might be
applied to all kinds of businesses.
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Glossary
Inntjening
Inntjeningssiden
Tjene penger
Lønnsomhet
Inntjeningsmessig
Beskatning
Overskuddet
Bidrag
Inntekter
Utgifter
Kostnader
Lønnsomhetskriterium
Koster penger
Intern prising
Resultatene (økonomiske)
Lønnsomhetssammenheng
Fortjeneste
Underskuddet
Driftskostnader
187
Investeringer
Investeringskostnader
Kostnadsgevinster
Egenkapital
188
References to theory
References to models, theories or well known authors from the business strategy- or
related fields.
Example: "Here I would apply the Porter-model concerning the forces of
competition".
Remarks: The subject refers to Porter, who is well known for his work on
business strategy. The model referred to is a theoretical model designed to apply to
the analysis of industries in general.
189
DOMAIN SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Strategy related knowledge
Statements about, or references to, the banking business in relation to elements of
business strategy. General theory, or translations of general theory into 'banking'
language does not qualify, but expressions implying use of industry-spesific
cognitive models do.
Example: "Eh, we are heavy in, let us say you were heavy, found that
you were heavy in people of 55+ [years of age], OK, but you were weak
on new salary-accounts, evidently this is a conveniant situation today but
unpleasent situation in 5-10 years.".
Remark: The subject is here referring to some market-characteristics particular for
the banking industry, associated with demographic segments of the market. These
characteristics are only relevant for the kind of products offered by banks.
190
Knowledge of industry specific economical matters
Statements expressing, or based upon, economy related issues specific for the
banking industry. These may be processes, mechanisms, transactions, and the like
particular for this industry, as well as direct references to the banking business.
Example: "If the market shares are those of savings accounts it would be a
catastrophe because he would have to go out and buy more expensive capital".
Remarks: This statement explicitly refers to economic matters ('expensive capital').
It is coded as industry specific because of the concepts 'savings accounts', the
implied sources of operation capital and their different profiles of cost. Such
financing is unike for banks and related businesses.
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Glossary
Tidsinnskudd
Utlånsrente
Rentemargin
Utlånsrente
Innskuddsrente
Tap
Funding
192
EPISODIC PROCESSES
Personal experiences
These are statements containing personal pronouns in referring to experiences of self
or ones organization.
Example: "This is exactly what we were discussing at the staff meeting
yesterday".
Remarks: The subject is clearly referring to his memory of an event, and uses the
personal pronoun 'we'.
193
Analogical processing
Statements involving the use of analogies, which may be taken from own or own
organization's behavior, events generally, behavior of customers or other firms and
the like. Analogies may take the form of examples or illustrations of the point made.
Example: "You will get the various business areas isolated, like the Stocks and
Shares Dept. where there has been some problems recently".
Remarks: The subject is here argumenting for the effect of a particular act, and use
the Stocks and Shares Dept. as a parallel.
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REFERENCES TO ACTIONS
These are statements ofprocedural nature. Typically, these are in the form of
hypothetic intentions of actions to take in relation to the situation referred to.
Example: "First of all, I would do an environmental analysis".
Remarks: 'Would do' indicate a concern with activity, Although it might never be
actualized in reality, the subject is referring to knowledge about a specific act that is
held to be appropriate in the context of the case as it is perceived.
195
Glossary
Jeg ville .
Jeg må .
- ville satset ...
196
INSTRUCTION FOR CODING SHEETS
The following instructions are for the use of the coding sheets. Please read them
carefully and follow the steps as numbered, as this has implications for the statistical
processing of the data.
1. Start from the beginning with the first statement. Try to match it
against the categories I, II ,III and IV, in that order. Ifmatch,
write down the number of the statement.
3. Proceed with the rest of the statements.
4. When in doubt, consult the examples and the notes associated with
them. The Glossary may also be of help. If there seems to be no
reasonable match, go to the next statement.
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CODING SHEET
Document i.d.: _
initials _
Coder's
Date _ Page of _
Category I
Statement #
a Analol:ical processinl:.
Statement #
b Personal experjences.
198
Category II
a Industry specific economy knowleda:e.
Statement #
b Industry specjfic stratea:y knowleda:e.
Statement #
199
Category III
a General economy concerns.
Statement #
Statement #
b General strate&ic princjples.
c References to theory.
Statement #
200
Category IV
Action
Statement #
VALIDATION DATA
201
APPENDIX2
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Table 1.1.: Multimeasurement of ANALOG
CASES!
CASES CaseI Case2 Case 3 Case4
CaseI
Case2
Case3
Case4
1.00
0.92*** 1.00
0.47*
-0.25
1.00
-0.12 1.00
0.37
-0.26
1 Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
* Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.1
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.05
*** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.01
Table 1.2.: Statistics of Variable ANALOG for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
CaseI 0.00 12.00 1.56 13.07 2.16
Case2 0.00 19.05 2.15 25.26 2.41
Case3 0.00 14.28 3.45 27.88 1.08
Case4 0.00 16.67 3.06 31.55 1.39
N=20
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Table 2.1.: Multimeasurement ofPERSEX
CASES 1
CASES Case l Case2 Case3 Case4
Case l
Case2
Case3
1.00
0.29
0.01
1.00
0.69*** 1.00
Case 4 0.59*** 0.66*** 0.41 * 1.00
l Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
* Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<O.l
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<0.05
*** Indicate that the correlationis significant at the a<O.Ol
Table 2.2.: Statistics of Variable PERSEX for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case l 0.00 28.26 2.93 45.43 3.03
Case2 0.00 23.81 2.21 33.21 2.96
Case3 0.00 13.04 1.43 11.72 2.43
Case4 0.00 50.00 10.04 248.75 1.37
N=20
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Table 3.1.: Multimeasurement of SPESEC
CASES l
CASES CaseI Case2 Case3 Case4
CaseI
Case2
Case3
1.00
0.08
0.16
1.00
0.85*** 1.00
Case 4 0.06 0.95*** 0.85*** 1.00
1Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
* Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<O.1
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<0.05
*** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<O.OI
Table 3.2.: Statistics of Variable SPESEC for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case l. 0.00 14.29 3.36 21.01 1.38
Case2 0.00 34.48 2.94 61.44 3.51
Case3 0.00 35.29 3.98 72.67 2.74
Case4 0.00 40.00 2.43 80.04 3.98
N=20
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Table 4.1.: Multimeasurement of SPESTRA
CASES 1
CASES Case 1
Case 1 1.00
Case2 -0.20
Case3 0.49**
Case4 0.04
Case2 Case 3 Case4
1.00
-0.15
0.39
1.00
0.09 1.00
1Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<0.05
Table 4.2.: Statistics of Variable SPESTRA for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case 1 0.00 100.00 35.67 657.70 0.79
Case2 0.00 74.19 33.02 479.59 0.16
Case3 0.00 100.00 66.35 573.89 -0.20
Case4 23.53 84.62 30.27 661.13 0.37
N=20
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Table 5.1.: Multimeasurement of GENEC
CASES 1
CASES Case l
Case l 1.00
Case2 -0.13
Case3 0.30
Case4 0.03
Case2 Case3 Case4
1.00
-0.04
0.07
1.00
-0.21 1.00
l Nwnbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
Table 5.2.: Statistics of Variable GENEC for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
CaseI 0.00 10.00 1.59 8.60 1.86
Case2 0.00 33.33 4.30 61.29 2.73
Case3 0.00 47.06 11.67 163.03 1.17
Case4 0.00 50.00 10.05 194.22 lAD
N=20
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Table 6.1.: Multimeasurement of GENSTRA
CASES 1
CASES Case l
Case l 1.00
Case2 0.70***
Case3 0.50**
Case4 0.54**
Case2 Case3 Case4
1.00
0.23
0.52**
1.00
0.45* 1.00
l Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
* Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.1
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.05
*** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.<0.01
Table 6.2.: Statistics of Variable GENSTRA for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case l 6.00 79.00 50.95 583.65 -0.45
Case2 0.00 94.74 42.20 659.15 0.17
Case3 0.00 53.66 14.03 246.20 0.87
Case4 0.00 95.46 39.80 924.93 0.21
N=20
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Table 7.1.: Multimeasurement of THEORY
CASES 1
CASES CaseI Case2 Case3 Case4
CaseI
Case2
Case3
Case4
1.00
0.56** 1.00
-0.011 1.000.01
1.00
1 Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<0.05
Table 7.2.: Statistics of Variable THEORY for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case 1 0.00 7.41 0.87 4.61 2.19
Case2 0.00 27.27 2.57 49.72 2.73
Case3 0.00 11.11 0.68 6.33 3.85
Case4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N=20
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Table 8.1.: Multimeasurement of ACTION
CASES l
CASES Case l Case2 Case3 Case4
Case 1
Case2
Case3
Case4
1.00
0.S7**
-o.OS
0.24
1.00
-0.16
0.307
1.00
0.31 1.00
1Numbers are Pearson correlation coefficients based on proportions of total coded
statements
2N= 19
** Indicate that the correlation is significant at the a<O.OS
Table 8.2.: Statistics of Variable ACTION for Each of the Four Cases
STATISTICS
CASES Min Range Mean Variance Skewness
Case 1 0.00 30.00 9.50 93.12 0.84
Case2 0.00 57.14 16.6S 247.96 0.88
Case3 0.00 2S.00 6.80 79.12 1.01
Case4 0.00 28.00 4.54 59.57 1.73
N=20
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APPENDIX 3
MINICASES
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1.
You are manager for a savings bank in a small Norwegian town. After a long period
of time with stabile growth your bank start losing market shares.
213
2.
Imagine that you are recently hired as manager for a large Norwegial commercial
bank. Your most important job is to formulate an applicable strategy for the next five
years.
214
3.
Imagine that you are the manager in a bank-branch in an area where the population
has increased strongly, mainly because ofpeople moving in. You have received
directives that home-loans to first-time home-loan applicants should have priority.
215
4.
Imagine that you are executive manager for a an exchange department (trade with
foreign currency) in a large commercial bank. The bank has through a long time
made a good profit on this operation. Presume that the authorities have decided that
this department are to be separated as an independent firm, that is as an independent
unit, legally and economically, with its own accountancy.

TRANSCRIBED AND CODED
PROTOCOLS
217
ApPENDIX 4
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MANAGER IN1ERVIEW1
CASE 1
1. [First of all I want you to describe this situation as you perceive it]2.
2. I am to describe this situation?
3. [Yes].
4. You are manager in a bank in a small Norwegian town, for a long time - you
start losing market shares (reads loud).
5. Yes, this could sure be a difficult situation, a troublesome situation.
6. Itmight be.
7. Mm, I don't know what you are after wheI_1you want me to describe the
situation.
8. [Well, ifyou could say something about when it is troublesome and when it is
not, for example].
9 . Yes, I would have to 'behind' it and see what is happening in this market.
GENSTRA
10. It could be a competitor who has entered the market.
GENSTRA
11. Mm, since it is about lost markedshares it is implied that the total market, i this
context, mm is of significance.
GENSTRA
l Coding is marked in large bold ledders: ANALOG
2 Text in brackets are my comments
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12. Is this a market that is growing such that I in reality maintain that which I am
concerned about and my profit, then this is less troublesome than if this is a
totalmarket where I notice that I cannot take a share of the growth and that it
starts having effect on my profit.
GENSTRA
13. So - in any case I would say that I would halt if I started losing market shares,
even if I were in an attractive market because it would be a signal to me that I
did not have the share of the growth that - that Icould.
GENSTRA
14. But, as I said - the seriousness of the situation depends on what market
situation the total market is in -.
GENSTRA
15. Eh - and I would look at what the causes might be-.
16. Iwould study the competition situation: Are there new direct competiors, are
there indirect competitors in the sense that other types of financing, other types
of investment - where do these funds go that Idon't get to partake in.
GENSTRA
17. This would be the place that I would start looking for causes.
18. The first I would have to start analyzing was what is this caused by.
19. [Are there other things in addition to new types of competitors and new
products you would look for?].
20. Yes
21. Well, I would, I would look for external cause, as I said for competitors, at the
total market.
GENSTRA
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22. Eh, for mm demographical changes that could explain that I did not grow as
much. GENSTRA
23. And, - I would also look for internal causes.
GENSTRA
24. Eh, concerning myself - this means, for ex., that I am no longer - shall we say
- positioned in the market the way I should.
GENSTRA
25. Within a local market we see changes in how and where people live, in the
choice of carreers and it might be that my earlier localization, my earlier
services are not so attractive any longer i relation to these changes.
SPESTRA
26. So it is evident that I would also look for possible causes with myself.
GENSTRA
27. [Your position relative to the customers that -l.
28. Yes, it might be localization, or it might be the services that I offer, or it might
be my way of marketing myself in that market.
GENSTRA
29. [If you should do something in relation to a situation like this, in addition to the
analysis, if you were to design a strategy, could you say something about what
you would -l.
30. I would in any case wait with choosing my strategy till I had these - this
analysis of causes on the table.
31. Because I believe it is very dangerous [jump on any solutions before I know
something about the cause.
32. It is evident that this causal relation is the most important basis for what I will
and should do.
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33. So I will not point to any particular strategy here and now, I thing this would
be to beg the issue.
34. [So you would get yourself a kind of symptom profile or causal explanation
and take action relative to it?].
35. Yes I would
36. But it is clear that I would try to see - try to evaluate the consequences of a
continuing development in a causal anaysis like this:
GENSTRA
37. Is it an aggressive competior that has entered, OK: how long may such an
attacker be aggressive, should I that in this context might be called a defensor,
should I accept the attacker's premises of should I rather 'sweat it out' and let
him work till he meets his own shall,we say aggressive marketing acts?
ACTION
38. That is appraisals that I - I would do in the continuation of a causal analysis like
this.
39. [If a competitor engages in aggresive acts, as you say, what might this be in a
concrete sense?].
40. Well, this might be that a new bank establises itself in the market here and he
really goes at it with a giant investment offer where - that is well beyond what I
offer for savings.
SPESTRA
41. It is clear that the market share, i that context, will be - then be - will then be -
loan - no, will then be the depositmarket
SPESTRA
42. Eh, he would steale deposits from me but he would, at the same time, have a
substantially more expensive funding than I do.
SPESTRA
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43. And then my choice og strategy is to sit - accept that he steals funding that he
prices up.
GENSTRA
44. Then he sits more expencively in the market with his money than me, and
consequently he must lend them more expensive than I to earn - he lives by and
large of the same margin as everybody else - and then I may either, as I said,
either respond in order to keep the money.
SPESTRA
45. Which means that I also sits with an expensive funding.
GENEC
46. And none of us has neither earned nor lost.
47. That is, I have lost because I now sits with a more expensive funding and he
has lost because in the sense that he don't get, probably, the money he wanted.
GENEC
48. An alternative strategy could be that I let him aquire this expensive funding and
underbid on loans so that he did not manage to take his preferred interest on
loans, for example., and squeeze him that way.
ACTION
49. So there are a lot ofpossibilities, but that I had to look into after I knew why
and where I lost market shares.
GENSTRA
50. CASE 2
51. Well, what am I supposed to do with this then?
52. [If you could just work from the assumptions which you might find
reasonable.] .
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53. Am I to formulate a strategy or how I would proceed to establish a strategy.
54. [Yes, how you would proceed and which elements you would attend the most
closely to.].
55. Well, it will to a large degree paralell what we discussed in the former case,
because clearly a strategy takes first and foremost the market I serve as a point
of departure. GENSTRA
56. It may be Norway, if it is a large national commercial bank, or it may be a local
market if it is a small commercial bank.
SPESTRA
57. It always starts here.
58. And the first thing I would have to know about then is what is the market and
how is the market developing.
GENSTRA
59. And as a rule a bank market consists of several submarkets.
SPESTRA
60. A lot of submarkets if you start splitting it up.
SPESTRA
61. Eh, in any case I would start with the main markets 'private/commercial' and
look at the magnitudes - absolute magnitudes and what trends I might find
there. SPESTRA
62. There is a lot to be found in public statistics, and industry statistics that could
offer me a lot - I would collect market data, that would be my first job.
GENSTRA
63. In parallel with this I would try to position my own bank in this - eh picture of
the market: where are we strong, where are we weak?
GENSTRA
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64. [Do you then think of such things as competence and structure of finance or-
?].
65. First I would look at - not that - I would look at absolute magnitudes of market
shares GENSTRA
66. [What the bank has got?].
67. What the bank has got in this market, that is when I have collected my market
data then I would find out where are we in this market, and again I would say
that you would very soon experience that there are many markets and even if
you would look at it nationally you would experience that you may split it into
demographic submarkets or industries etc., etc.
SPESTRA
68. So I would prefer to do a somewhat thorough job in this field.
69. And then I would try to - on the basis of that - to draw some
opportunities/threats (- some unintelligible here on the trends found in the
analysis).
GENSTRA
70. Eh, we are heavy in, let us say you were heavy, found that you were heavy in
people of 55+ (years), OK, but you were weak on new salary-accounts,
evidently this is a conveniant situation today but unpleasent situation in 5-10
years.
SPESTRA
71. You were maybe heavy in some industry exhibiting typical tendencies of
stagnation while you were weak in others.
GENSTRA
72. So then you would try to look for where I am and where I will be if I do not do
something.
GENSTRA
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73. And I would also try to calculate the profitability in serving these markets,
which in bank can be very difficult because they are so interrelated.
GENEC
74. But I would, all the same, try.
75. And then you are approaching - I had almost said - the beginning of the
formulation of a strategy.
76. Then I have a material enabling me to say: ifwe do like this then we may expect
that to happen.
77. If we do like this we may expect that it happens.
78. So I would hopefully find some areas to fokusupon (invest in), I would find
some submarkets that I ought to follow up and others to downplay.
GENSTRA
79. And then the next stage is to see - if you are going towards that market - what
resources have to do so?
GENSTRA
80. Have we got the people, are we located where they expect us to be, have we
got the services that we must expect them to demand, have we got the
competence etc., etc. GENSTRA
81. And then you might say that relative to which areas of investment I chose to
focus upon I had to go back to myseld and see - if we are going towards that
market we have to do so and so concerning personnell, we have to do this
concerning the technical side - our technology, and we have to do that with the
product side and so I would build my strategy after that submarket.
GENSTRA
82. This way I would proceed after this.
226
83. The problem is, of course, especially in the bankmarket I believe, is that there
are - formidable changes, and it is very dangerous I think to build a strategy
that is too tightly locked.
SPESTRA
84. What I would, what I would have in the back of the mind all the time when
construing the strategy, was one word, which is flexibility.
85. Because I believe it is dangerous if you, if you become so strategic in your way
of thinking that you in a way commit yourself to costs and personnelI that
suddenly is become a straight-jacket because the market turned.
GENSTRA
86. There are after all some examples where, ifyou asked med a year ago then I
would say that I would go for the new instruments, I would build up a broker-
apparatus that could trade for my customers because it is on the stock exchange
the money are. ANALOG
87. Then maybe today I would sit with a damned costly broker apparatus that
would not have the damnest thing to do - the word 'flexibility' I believe is a
word that I would have with me in a strategy like this.
SPESTRA
88. In other words I would not expose - I would be very concerned about that the
investments I do in my market strategy, they should not be larger then I could
stand a mistake.
GENEC
89. [This is the way you could be flexible, is that it?].
90. Yes, in other words I would - it is very easy when you are turned on by a
market - area of investment, that you invest yourself to death also within the
banking industry in the form of personnell, technical equipment, new localities
etc., etc.
SPESTRA
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91. Consequently you build up very fast a lot of things and what is quite sure is
that you will have the costs but revenue allways come later than you have
planned for in your strategy.
GENSTRA
92. So it is kind of the old rule that you - costs are as a rule greater than you have
budgeted while revenue as a rule allways are less.
GENSTRA
93. I would, as I said, be careful about formulating a strategy that was not very
flexible such that I all the time had room for maneuring for shifting course
when basic conditions change.
GENSTRA
94. [And that flexibility can you attain by not investing more than you can afford to
lose?].
95. That is for ex. one way of doing it, it is one way to do it.
96. Then I will rather lose a part in a growth market in a startup stage to be - to be
quite sure that I go, you see now and then - it pays to be, not the first but the
second, to put it that way.
GENSTRA
97. CASE 3
98. Well, if I was in a bank branch then - and was given directions to do so, then I
would manage to earn money on this (venture).
GENEC
99. Because then I would squeeze the head quarter that issued these directions and
say that OK for me but then you have to pay.
ACTION
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100. An other thing is that authorities have established subsidization arrangements
which will enable us to earn more on these things today then we did - or I am
going to earn more on these things than I did two months ago.
SPESTRA
101. [So the authorities are also a factor here then?].
102. Yes, today they are.
103. [Not only in a regulatory sense?].
104. No, they have established economical systems of subsidizing for first time
housing appliers (shopping/or a home/or thefirst time) which give me some
percent from the authorities for the loans I give them, and this helps a lot.
SPESTRA
105. But, mm - I don't see this as, as a problem per ce - because what I would say is
that I have a market that has a need.
GENSTRA
106. And that market has a need for homes, that is rather straight forward.
GENSTRA
. 107. If shall survive in this market then I at least have to satisfy that demand.
108. So in that sense the market situation and the directions agree.
109. I have not much to do in that market if I cannot give home loans.
SPESTRA
110. That would be to push the customers over to the competitors, anyway.
GENSTRA
111. So I have to satisfy the marketneed.
GENSTRA
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112. And then it is the question of how I might do that and in the same time maintain
my profitability: I perceive that as the problem.
GENEC
113. And then I will say it may be solved in several ways.
114. The most important for those applying for home is a favorable, let us say
liquidity situation, and then it is not allways necessarily the loan interest that is
decisive, then it is the total payment which is of consequence.
SPESTRA
115. So I would take the price I would - I need in order to earn money on the the
funding I have, but instead let these have a more favorable situation, either by
letting them have a payment free period or by changing the payment profile for
them such that they had a lighter load, so I don't perceive this as an impossible
situation.
GENEC
116. I may very well take what I want in loan interest and still, and still earn a decent
amount of money on it, but I may have to accept that it take longer time before
these money return to me.
GENEC
117. But to me it is indifferent whether it is one person borrowing or if it is three
borrowing the money as long as I make a profit.
GENEC
118. It is evident that some would say that I could made more money by lending
them out for consumtion and obtaineda higher interest, which is probably
correct The risk is, on the other hand, much higher on loans for consumption,
the security of a home (in relation to the loan) is damned good so I would not
perceive this thing here as - as an impossible situation.
GENEC
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119. What I see is that I would also tty to help these by placing some of the demand
with alternative fundingsources so that Idid not sit as sole home financer, that I
retained the top financing (generally second priority security in the home in
question) which is the most profitable in the lending perspective.
ACTION
120. There are, after all, a whole range of money institutions that cannot accept
anything less than first priority, Iwould tty to establish a good cooperation
with the local insurance company, the local Realcredit and the local Home
Financing Bank (owned and operated by the Government in order to secure
reasonable loans for some categories of home buyers) and tty to channel as
much as possible of the first priority and the lowest prized home loans there
and then Iwould take the top financing wich after all is the most expensive and
shortest termed (must be payed back over a shorter span of time) money.
GENEC
121. And this way satisfy the customer's need and simultaneously get the most
profit from the money.
122. [So there are more ways than one to go, then?].
123. Yes
124. CASE 4
125. [Could you first comment on your reactions to the situation?].
126. Well, the situation in itselfwould I say that if - I don't react to it in the sense
that when the circumstances change then this is something we have to live with.
GENSTRA
127. If the authorities decide that the bank as such no longer may do exchange
business (buying and selling foreign currency) and this has to be separated into
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a company of its own - well, then it is just to separate it into a company of its
own.
SPESTRA
128. It won't influence on the market situation and it won't influence the situation of
supply.
GENSTRA
129. It implies for me, as it is described here, just that this has to be organized in a
legally independent unit (a new firm) instead of a department as it was earlier.
GENSTRA
130. But whether i am executive manager for a department or executive manager in a
firm owned by the bank or whatever, I can't see any dramatic problems here.
GENSTRA
131. [It has no great consequences?].
132. No.
133. Because we even now operate our departments, as f. ex. Department of
Exchange, as profit centres.
PERSEX
134. I have a requirement-, as manager for a department like that I would have a
requirement of profiability,
GENSTRA
135. So for me this is only a formality in relation to what is the situation right now.
136. [But might it imply greater possibilities for control or visibility in relation to the
rest of the accounts, or the organization do you think?].
137. Naturally - no not in relation to the rest of the organization.
138. It is possible that - it is possible that - you would have an indepentent board of
directors established with its own responsibility, with its own 'general meeting'
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and if this was a firm owned a hundred percent then these people would be the
same that you reported to whether it.was a 'general meetin' or a regular
department meeting, so I conceive this as more or less the same thing.
GENSTRA
139. Exchange trade is not a very visible operation at all because it is an expert
function where you - shall we say - aquires, buys and sells foreign currency on
behalf of either the bank itself or on behalf of large customers and I believe that
those customers you will still have.
SPESTRA
140. The bank would have to trade through this firm,
141. You would have two different accounts, as I said, and it is possible that it
might be of some consequence for the authorities but concerning our internal
accountency then we have already this, shall we say overview, to see what
profit have we here and what losses here ..
PERSEX
142. [So this mean that you would not do anything dramatic about it?].
143. No, I would not quit the company or hang myself, or, for that matter, started
writing in the newspapers on this account.
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STUDENT INTERVIEW
Case 1
1. It probably means that another bank take over our fonner customers, in one way
or another.
GENSTRA
2. Either because they had a better offer or because they [bank in the case] have
made worse offers on interersts and things.
GENSTRA
3. [Interests and things-are there other things you might think ofl]
4. Sure, there are other things-it could be like service and treatment of customers,
general information and attitudes toward the customer, you might say.
SPESTRA
5. [Have you any opinions of what might cause these things?]
6. It has to do with competition because it is market shares.
GENSTRA
7. Say it is about the that part ofthe fmance market that the banks control, then it
has to be something the other banks have done.
GENSTRA
8. But what is behind this-then one must look at what the bank, or its employees,
have been doing through the years, and the strategy it has chosen.
9. [If you found yourself in such a situation and wanted to find out what was
behind it-which questions would you ask yourself"]
10. The first I would do was looking at competing banks and their actions, and
compare this with what we had been doing in the same period.
GENSTRA
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11. If there was not a big difference there, I would look at what happened at the
front desk; ask customers that had quitted about their reasons for doing so.
SPESTRA
12. [Other things?]
13. Yes, there are a lot of procedures to engage in to have such information.
14. But in general, you have to find information about customers and the
competitors. ACTION
15. [If you found yourself in this situation, what do you think you would do?]
16. You mean, to get out the situation?
17. That would depend on what I found in the earlier stage.
18. I would go for offers to our customers, match those to the customers if they
were less attractive then other' s new offers that was better--designed them to
those variables that was critical to the customer.
ACTION
19. [So the work would really be put into the analysis?]
20. At first, yes.
21. Then I would approach the critical customers that might be won back.
ACTION
22. [Tried direct contact, is that it?]
23. Yes, direct contact.
Case 2
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24. Then I will ask you-if you look towards the environment, what information
would you like to have to do this job?]
25. The goal would be to have a high revenue, that is the greatest possible difference
between interest on deposits and interest on loans.
GENEC
26. What you do in this situation is dependent on getting those customers willing to
pay them, and that is a special type of market.
GENSTRA
27. This is customers that may be grouped.
SPESTRA
28. Well, group those customers that are especially strong and that was willing to
pay the money.
GENSTRA
29. And the same for the deposit side.
30. Have an account to disposal with a low interest and what offers we might give
them-access to loans-maximize the difference between interest on deposits
and interest on loans.
SPESTRA
31. This would be the content, then, but then there is the strategy for realizing it-
that is a large thing indeed.
32. [You only need to take the principal-. Are there other things you-?]
33. Yes, say you had some kind of survey view of the cusomers that is adequate and
relevant.
34. Then it would be to approach them in writing with some kind of marketing
things-. ACTION
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35. [So you would have a marketing problem relative to these important
customers?].
36. Yes, and some kind of contact information.
37. And then one would have to play several cards.
38. There are various types of commercial banks.
SPESTRA
39. The more Oslo-type of banks and banks like them have secured for themselves
special customers by personal contact.
SPESTRA
40. But if you are a general commercial bank then-of an ordinary type-then you
might perhaps use the same kind of strategy there too, but there you must also
go for the type of strategy that fits [their type of market].
ACTION
Case 3
41. [Could you first say something about the situation here?]
42. You have to reckon with people moving in-that is, if those moving to the area
are of the same type that we are supposed to give priority-first time home loans
applicants-unge people in their 20/30s-.
43. Well, what am I supposed to-?
44. [First about how you perceive the situation].
45. This could be a somewhat difficult customer group-this is a directive which is
issued centrally from the bank or the government, and to follow such a strategy
is not automatically profiable-if you cannot have a high interest, and you
probably cannot even though it doesn 't say here.
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GENEC
46. But even though this is not a tempting strategy immediately one could try to tum
it to ones own bank's interest in the longer run.
SPESTRA
47. [What do you mean by that?].
48. These here are going to get older-they establish themselves, get a job and
family. They will develop to become more average kind of customers as the
years pass and then this group will be just as attractive as other groups.
SPESTRA
49. And then of course you can follow the same strategy in relation to this group,
but with the difference that that you would have to think more in a long time
perspective, and the investment placed in this is that you must give them cheaper
loans and you are dependent upon having some return on this investment in the
long run.
SPESTRA
50. An other thing is to compensate for the extra cost through some contribution
from the government or centrally.
SPESTRA
51. This might be the interest from The Bank of Norway and degree of revenue
relative to the central management of the bank.
52. I would secure my position as manager.
53. [Are there anything you would seek more information about or things you
would like to know more about?].
54. Concerning this group it depends on what kind of carrier they could be expected
to have in the future.
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Case 4
55. [Can you say anything about this situation?].
56. This is a decision that is connected with the fact that this valutaenterprise have a
different character then the rest of the banking business; it has a special risk
associated with it which the central management of the bank perceive as
important that the compartment itself takes responsibility for.
SPESTRA
57. I suppose this is the situation they find themselves in.
58. Then there is the question how this manager choose to handle this situation
strategically and operative.
59. [Is there anything in particular you would be careful to do-?].
60. Well, the authorities, I didn't think of them, it is the authorities that have decided
this. SPESTRA
61. That means it could have something to do with the less fortunate aspects of the
banking business--stocks and valuta trading-so they want to enforce
independent accounts for this particular business.
SPESTRA
62. [If you was responsible for this operation, what would you do to ensure a
successful completion?].
63. Then I would have to have a special agreement and some rules about sharing of
risk and profit between this compartment and the rest of the bank.
GENSTRA
64. And that would be dependent upon how risky this enterprise is, how speculative
it is, the quality of the transaction with the customers and the customers of the
bank-I suppose it is more or less the same customers.
SPESTRA
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65. When I had made clear the mutual relationship to the rest of the bank-
negotiated a deal there-how this should be organized and handled, then I would
design a strategy with respect to our stance relative to the rest of the market.
ACTION

